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Abstract
We develop a general model for finding the optimal penal strategy based on the behav-
ioral traits of the offenders. We focus on how the discount rate (level of time discounting)
affects criminal propensity on the individual level, and how the aggregation of these effects
influences criminal activities on the population level. The effects are aggregated based on
the distribution of discount rate among the population. We study this distribution em-
pirically through a survey with 207 participants, and we show that it follows zero-inflated
exponential distribution. We quantify the effectiveness of the penal strategy as its net
utility for the population, and show how this quantity can be maximized. When we apply
the maximization procedure on the offense of impaired driving (DWI), we discover that
the effectiveness of DWI deterrence depends critically on the amount of fine and prison
condition.
Keywords: General Deterrence, Rational Choice Theory, Social Welfare Function, Eco-
nomic Optimization, Time Preference, Impaired Driving
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1. Introduction
It is commonly accepted that crimes are detrimental to the general well-being of a society,
so it is socially favorable to reduce the level of criminal activities through the implemen-
tation of certain legal practices (Dostoyevsky, 2017). In some modern theories of crime,
this argument is formalized using an economic model, which attempts to characterize a
criminal offense by the social disutility it generates for the population (Becker, 1968). The
net disutility is evaluated as the difference of the benefit it generates for the offender and
the cost it incurs for the victim. And by taking the sum of the disutilities of all criminal
offenses, we obtain the total disutility of criminal activities in the population. Therefore,
through reducing the level of criminal activities, the total disutility is effectively decreased,
thus achieving a more socially favorable state (Ehrlich, 1996) for the population.
It is important to predict the effectiveness of the legal practices before they are imple-
mented. To do so accurately, it is necessary to first predict the level of criminal activities in
a population. This is done through an understanding of the underlying mechanism behind
how the level of criminal activities is influenced by certain legal practices. This understand-
ing can be achieved by applying the concept of deterrence in penology, which states that
the threat of punishment prevents a person from committing a crime (Jervis, 1979). We can
formalize this concept under the framework of rational choice theory (Von Neumann et al.,
2007) by focusing on the net utility of crime for the offender. The net utility is simply the
difference of the utility that the crime rewards the offender and the expected disutility that
the potential punishment incurs. Therefore, by increasing the threat of punishment, the
expected disutility of punishment will be greater, and the offender will be less inclined to
commit the crime. If the threat of punishment increases to the point where the net utility
becomes negative for the offender, then the offender will decide against committing the
crime (in accordance with rational choice theory), and a successful deterrence is achieved.
To quantify the “threat of punishment” as a disutility, we denote the specific implemen-
tation of the legal practices as a penal strategy, which we specify with factors such as the
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severity, certainty, and celerity of the punishment (Jervis, 1979).
A penal strategy generates social benefits as the reduction of criminal activities; how-
ever, it also generates social costs as a direct result of its implementation (Greenberg, 1990).
These costs generally increase with the threat of punishment that the strategy imposes.
For example, increasing the certainty of punishment implies using more police resources
for criminal detection, and increasing the severity of punishment implies using more prison
resources to enforce a longer term of imprisonment. Besides the implementation cost, the
punishment itself is also a disutility for the offender, which appears as the opportunity cost,
stigma, and any dissatisfaction that is associated with the punishment (Menninger, 1968).
It is crucial that this disutility is included as a cost of the penal strategy, as the utility
function of the offender is also part of the utility function of the society (Arrow, 1950). The
optimal penal strategy should aim to maximize the difference of the all benefits and costs
it generates.
The social benefit of the penal strategy is associated with the nonoccurrence of crimes
while the social cost is associated with the occurrence (and the ensuing punishment) of
crimes. To evaluate the benefits and costs, it is necessary to predict the number of criminal
offenses under the penal strategy. Before we make this prediction on the population level,
we first study the occurrence of a criminal offense under the penal strategy on the individual
level. To begin with, we assume that whether a crime occurs or not depends on various
traits of the offender and victim (Tittle et al., 2003), which we can denote as the parame-
terization of their utility functions, or utility parameters. Individuals with different utility
parameters evaluate the net utility of the crime differently, resulting in the difference in
their decisions of whether to commit the crime or not. For example, offenders with different
perceptions of risk may evaluate the disutility of the threat of punishment differently, and
those who perceive the disutility to be greater are less likely to commit the crime. There-
fore, it is possible to make an a priori categorization of an individual as a potential offender
or non-offender based on how he/she evaluates the net utility of crime using his/her utility
parameters. We then extend this analysis to the population level by studying how these
parameters are distributed among the population. We first evaluate the net utility of crime
for every individual under the penal strategy in effect, and record the number of times that
the net utilities evaluate to a negative value. This number is then equal to the predicted
number of criminal offenses in the population, which we can use to compute the benefits
and costs associated with the penal strategy. The difference of benefits and costs is the net
utility of the penal strategy for the population, and the goal is to find the optimal penal
strategy that maximizes this net benefit.
As an example, we focus on the time preference of an individual as his/her major
behavioral trait, and study how this trait influences his/her criminal propensity towards
committing the offense of impaired driving (DWI). In this work, an individual’s time prefer-
ence is described using the hyperbolic time discounting model (Thaler, 1981), under which
the level of time preference can be quantified as the rate at which the discounting function
decays, or discount rate. In short, a person with a larger discount rate will assign a higher
value to present rewards relative to future rewards, so he/she is more likely going to commit
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a crime as the relative value of the immediate reward from the crime is greater with respect
to the potential future punishment (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2004). The discount rate then
serves as a strong predictor of whether an individual will become a DWI offender, and by
knowing how the discount rate is distributed among a population, we can accurately pre-
dict the number of DWI incidents under a penal strategy. The goal of this paper is then to
empirically measure this distribution, evaluate explicitly the net social benefit that a penal
strategy generates based on this distribution, and find the penal strategy that maximizes
this net social benefit.
We first briefly present the structure of the paper. In section 2, we describe the time
preference and risk perception of an individual in terms of hyperbolic time discounting
(Thaler, 1981) and probability weighing function (Tversky and Fox, 1995), and discuss how
these two traits generate variations in individual criminal propensities. In section 3, we
use a graph theoretical (West et al., 1996) approach to model the criminal activities in a
population as a directed graph, with an arrow denoting a criminal offense pointing from the
offender to the victim. Given a penal strategy, the graph is partitioned into two subgraphs,
one consisting of the offenders and one consisting of the non-offenders1. The social welfare
function (Arrow, 1950) is constructed as the sum over the graph connections. In section 4,
we derive an explicit expression for the social welfare function based on several simplifying
assumptions in the context of DWI. In section 5, we find the optimal penal strategy by
maximizing the social welfare function, and show that abrupt changes in the optimum can
be realized by varying the amount of fine and prison conditions. In section 6, we estimate
empirically how the discount rate (denoting the level of time preference) and probability
weighing factor (denoting the level of risk aversion) are distributed among the population
by conducting a survey for 207 participants; in addition, we show that the two behavioral
traits are distributed independently. In section 7, we discuss several possible extensions to
our model which can be made to account for a wider range of behavioral traits and more
complex criminal patterns.
2. Preliminaries
The main goal of this paper is to find the optimal penal strategy. However, at this point,
this is an ill-defined goal as we have not yet defined exactly what constitutes a penal strategy
(or what we are trying to optimize over) and exactly what this penal strategy should aim
to maximize (or what we are trying to find the optimum of). To formally define the
optimization problem, we first have to introduce the necessary concepts in penology and
economy. We first provide a brief overview of the concept of deterrence in criminology
(Jervis, 1979), and introduce the object of penal strategy which quantifies the “level” of
deterrence. We then briefly discuss the concepts of hyperbolic time discounting (Thaler,
1981) and prospect theory (Tversky and Fox, 1995) in the context of deterrence. Finally,
we illustrate how a person’s behavioral traits can be specified by the parameters of his/her
utility function (Von Neumann et al., 2007), and we use a person’s discount rate as an
illustrative example.
1. This is technically not the case as we are partitioning the edges instead of the nodes. However, in section
4, we show that the two partitioning schemes are equivalent in the context of DWI.
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2.1 Penal Strategy
Deterrence theory states that the threat of punishment prevents people from committing
crimes. In its traditional formulation, a penal strategy is specified by three main factors -
the severity, certainty, and celerity of punishment. and the celerity of punishment (Jervis,
1979). It is generally believed that the strength of each factor is correlated with the level of
criminal activities in a population, and there has been a fair share of studies justifying these
correlations (Antunes and Hunt, 1973; Yu, 1994), both theoretical and empirical. Interest-
ingly, the results seem to disagree wildly on the prominence of these correlations (Mendes,
2004; Gray and Martin, 1969), with some going as far as to questioning the signs of the
correlations (Sherman, 1993).
In this work, we define an object named penal strategy which factors into a person’s
utility function in the form of the expected level of punishment. Whenever an individual
decides to commit a crime, he/she absorbs this disutility subconsciously into his/her utility
function to evaluate whether committing crime is “worth it” or not (see section 3.2). Under
a particular class of crime, a penal strategy can be specified by a vector of parameters φ. As
an example, for the crime of DWI, a penal strategy can be specified with five parameters,
φ = {p, f, t, τ, r} = {10%, $200, 1 day, 6 hours, r}. Given this strategy, the offender is ap-
prehended with probability p = 10% (certainty of punishment), and he/she has the choice of
being punished with a fine f = $200 or be imprisoned for a duration of τ = 6 hours (severity
of punishment), with the delay in punishment being t = 1 day (celerity of punishment).
The parameter r is an abstract quantity describing the rate at which disutility is incurred
onto an individual during imprisonment (see section 2.2), and can be roughly interpreted as
how “unpleasant” the imprisonment condition is (Friedman, 1999). One may be tempted
to lump this quantity together with τ and define rτ simply as the total disutility incurred
on the individual during imprisonment, thus effectively quantifying the “severity” of pun-
ishment. Even ignoring the effect of hyperbolic time discount (see section 2.2), this coarse
characterization of “severity” makes sense only if the goal to focus on how severity affects
the personal utility function of the offender. If we take into account the cost of social utility
in actually implementing this strategy, r is substantially different from τ in the sense that
increasing r (making the condition more unpleasant) incurs little cost while increasing τ
(increasing the term of imprisonment) incurs a cost that scales roughly proportional to τ
(see section 4.3). This seems to suggest that making the imprisonment condition more un-
pleasant is a more economically efficient strategy than increasing the term of imprisonment,
which is true only to a certain extent, as we shall discuss in section 52.
The discrepancy between the offender’s personal utility function and the victim’s utility
function (even in the absence of the convolution of behavioral traits such as time discount-
2. It has been suggested that prisons should be made as unpleasant as possible since making the prison
more unpleasant (increasing r) costs essentially nothing (Friedman, 1999) while at the same time being
able to decrease the level of criminal activity. However, this strategy is justified only if the well-being of
the criminal is ignored as a factor for the social welfare function, then in this case the optimal strategy
would trivially be a strategy that is infinitely unpleasant (e.g. execution). A more in-depth and practical
study of the effect of r on the total social benefit is presented in section 5.3
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ing and risk preference) is the source of non-triviality for finding the optimal penal strategy
(see section 2.4). In fact, one can observe a rather nice duality between this discrepancy
in the utility functions to the characterization of specific and general deterrence3. Specific
deterrence focuses on the effect of punishment targeting the offender after the crime has
been committed. A strategy based on the principle of specific deterrence would then focus
on the utility function of the offender, and the optimal penal strategy under this framework
would be a strategy that incurs the minimal amount of disutility on the offender (while at
the same time being sufficient enough to deter future offenses). On the other hand, general
deterrence focuses on the effect of the threat of punishment on preventing any crimes from
occurring in the first place. A strategy based on the principle of general deterrence would
then focus on the utility functions of the victims and non-offenders, and the optimal penal
strategy under this framework would be a strategy threatening a large amount of disutility
on the offender. In an ideal world, this means that crime would occur very infrequently,
which decreases the social cost of enforcing any punishment and increases the social benefit
of the victims (see 4.3 for a formal discussion).
It is then natural to let the function of which we try to find the maximum be the social
welfare function (Arrow, 1950) which includes the sum of the utilities of all members in
the population - the offenders, victims, and non-offenders. Under this definition of the
optimization problem, the distinction between specific deterrence and general deterrence is
non-existence from an utilitarian standpoint. As maximizing this function guarantees that
the penal strategy is optimal in both frameworks of deterrence. The optimal penal strategy
should then accomplishes three goals which all contribute to the maximization of the social
welfare function, thus achieving an utilitarian optimum. The first goal is to maximize the
total number of members that can be deterred from committing the crime in the first place;
the second goal is to minimize the cost of implementing the strategy itself; and the third
goal is to minimize the disutility incurred on the offender during the punishment. Note that
this optimum, in general, does not correspond to the judicial optimum, where the level of
punishment matches exactly with the degree of crime (Hamilton and Rytina, 1980), and the
correlation between the two optima is an interesting point of research that we leave open
for our future work.
2.2 Hyperbolic Time Discounting
Hyperbolic time discounting is a time-inconsistent model that accounts for the phenomenon
that a delayed reward is generally less appealing to a human than an immediate reward, even
though the reward is the same (Thaler, 1981). There has been studies on how hyperbolic
time discounting affects the behaviors of the offenders, and how it affects their perception
of deterrence (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Loughran et al., 2012). However, the works are
mostly empirically, and to our knowledge, there has been no work on how the phenomenon
of hyperbolic time discounting can be actually used to inform an optimal penal strategy.
3. There is a nice overview of these two modes of deterrence in the paper (Stafford and Warr, 1993).
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Formally, we can define a particular reward to be A, and the utility gain of receiving
that reward delayed by t to be u(A, t). We can then express u(A, t) as follow
u(k,A, t) =
u(A, 0)
1 + kt
,
where u(A, 0) is the utility gain of receiving the reward immediately. We see that u(A, t) is
a monotonously decreasing function with respect to t, with k governing the rate of decrease.
For the rest of the paper, we refer to k as the discount rate4, which is a parameter that fully
specifies the discounting function. The utility of a delayed reward can be easily generalized
for modeling the disutility of a delayed punishment, where we simply interpret u(A, t) as
the disutility of a punishment, A, delayed by time t.
A more interesting application of the discounting function would be to evaluate the
disutility of a continuous punishment, such as imprisonment, by integrating the discounting
function with respect to time. To be more specific, we consider a continuous punishment
where the disutility per unit of time is −r. If the punishment is enforced continuously in
the time window [t1, t2] on an offender whose discount rate is k, then the total disutility
that the individual receives is
u(k, r, t1, t2) =
∫ t2
t1
−rt
1 + kt
dt = − r
k
log
[1 + kt2
1 + kt1
]
.
Alternatively, we can denote t = t1 as the time duration from the current time to the start
of the punishment, and τ = t2− t1 as the length of the punishment. This allows us to write
u(k, r, t, t+ τ) = − r
k
log
[
1 +
kτ
1 + kt
]
. (1)
In the context of imprisonment, we can interpret r as the disutility that the individual
receives per unit time during imprisonment, including the opportunity cost of not working
and the discomfort of the jail/prison environment. We denote r as the harshness of the
imprisonment condition. We can interpret τ as the term of imprisonment and t as the time
between getting caught to the punishment being enforced. In the language of deterrence
theory, the pair {r, τ} quantifies the “severity” of punishment, and t quantifies the “celer-
ity” of punishment.
We can easily check the asymptotic behavior of u(k) in the following two limits
lim
k→0
u(k) = −rτ lim
k→∞
u(k) = − lim
k→∞
r
k
log
[τ
t
]
= 0.
For a person with a discount rate of k = 0, the perceived disutility is simply the total disu-
tiltiy of imprisonment in the absence of time discounting. As the discount rate k increases,
the magnitude of u decreases monotonously, meaning that the threat of imprisonment is less
4. Technically speaking, this is an abuse of notation as the discount rate is only well-defined for the model
of exponential time discounting, because the relative decay rate is constant for an exponential function
but not for a hyperbolic function. Therefore, we use the terminology “discount rate” purely for the sake
of denoting the parameter k in this context.
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effective for an individual with a higher discount rate. In the limit of large k, the disutility
begins to scale inversely with the k, and approaches zero for k →∞.
Suppose we are implementing a strategy with the hope of incurring a disutility of −u0
for the offender, then there the two parameters {t, τ} have to follow some constraint. To
find this constraint, we set the expression in equation 1 equal to −u0
u(r, t, t+ τ) =− r
k
log
[
1 +
kτ
1 + kt
]
= −u0
=⇒ τ =(eku0/r − 1)(1
k
+ t).
(2)
Note that τ scales linearly with t, with the slope being eku0/r−1, which scales exponentially
with k. This means that when a punishment is delayed, the length of the punishment has to
increase accordingly in order to “compensate” for the disutility decay. For an individual with
a higher discount rate k, the disutility decay as a result of the delay will be more prominent,
so the length of punishment has to be increased by a greater amount to incur the desired
disutility for the individual. In some sense, for an offender with a large discount rate k,
the factor of “celerity” is more important than “severity”. This discussion is formalized in
appendix 55.
2.3 Probability Weighing Function
Having discussed the concept of hyperbolic time discounting and relating it to two of the
three factors of deterrence - severity and celerity of punishment, we move on to the third
factor of deterrence - certainty of punishment, which we should refer to more formally as
probability of apprehension. This factor can be modeled under the economic framework of
prospect theory (Tversky and Fox, 1995). Simply put, prospect theory states that for an
event with some known probability of occurring, the probability perceived by a human is
different from the actual probability. Therefore, when an individual is presented with an
uncertain reward, the expected utility gain that he/she perceives is not the actual expected
utility, as exemplified by Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).
Consider a simple lottery L presented to an individual. The lottery returns reward A
with probability p, and returns reward B with probability (1−p), then the expected utility
gain that the lottery returns is
E(u(L)) = pu(A) + (1− p)u(B).
This is, however, not the utility gain that the individual perceives. In fact, the perceived
expected utility is given by
U = pi(p)u(A) + pi(1− p)u(B),
where pi is commonly termed the probability weighting function, a function that attempts
to model how human evaluates the utility of uncertain events. The probability weighting
function can be expressed as
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ , (3)
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which is an inverse S shaped function with its level of curvature governed by the param-
eter γ ∈ (0, 1), which we term the probability weighing factor. The probability weighing
factor appears to be different across different people and across different classes of re-
wards/punishments, but empirical estimates of its value generally fall within the range
[0.5, 0.7] (Andreoni et al., 2010). In section 6.2, we empirically estimate the mean of γ
among our survey sample to be γ ≈ 0.61 in the context of weighing the risk of commit-
ting DWI. Note that other forms of pi(p) do exist (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999) which contains
more than one parameters, but for this work, we focus on the form as appeared in equation 3.
It can be easily checked that the function pi(p) satisfies the regularity condition of
pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1. This is required as impossible events should be perceived as
impossible, and certain events should be perceived as certain. In addition to the regularity
conditions, pi(p) is constructed such that there is another solution to pi(p) = p for p ∈ (0, 1).
We can denote this solution as p∗, then it can be shown that (see appendix A)
pi(p) > p if p < p∗
pi(p) < p if p > p∗.
This corresponds to the phenomenon that humans tend to overweight low-probability events
and underweight high-probability events.
Therefore, under a particular deterrent strategy with the probability of apprehension
being p, the offender will perceive that probability as being pi(p). This discrepancy has
to be taken into account when evaluating the probability of apprehension for the optimal
penal strategy (see section 5.4). To see this clearly, consider a punishment incurring a
disutility of −u0 on the offender, then the offender will perceive the expected disutility to
be −pi(p)u0, instead of −pu0. For p < p∗, the former is greater than the latter, meaning
that the individual will over-evaluating the threat of punishment. The same argument
goes for p > p∗, where the individual will under-evaluate the threat of punishment. From
a very cursory cost-benefit analysis, this suggests that a deterrent strategy with a low
probability of apprehension is more economically efficient. To see this, assume that the cost
of apprehension is cpp, which scales linearly with the probability of apprehension. We then
compute the perceived disutility per unit of cost to be
pi(p)u0
cpp
∝ pi(p)
p
,
which is a monotonously decreasing function for sufficiently small p (see appendix A). In
fact, this ratio tends to infinity when p→ 0, which suggests a deterrence strategy with zero
probability of apprehension.
This is obviously not right, and the reason why this simple analysis breaks down is
because we failed to consider the full utility function of the offenders, which includes the
utility gain returned from the crime itself (see section 3.2). For now, equation 2.3 offers
a nice intuitive insight as to why it may be preferable to use a deterrent strategy with
low probability of apprehension, though it should be interpreted as a serious attempt for
studying the cost-benefit ratio with respect to parameter p.
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2.4 Utility Function
There have been many studies investigating the correlations between criminal activity
and obvious predictors such as wealth (Barnett, 1979), level of education (Lochner and
Moretti, 2004), and social environment (Wiatrowski et al., 1981). Recently, there has been
an emergence of studies offering behavioral analyses of the motivation behind criminal
activity, which attempt to differentiate multiple facets of the behavioral traits including
time-inconsistent behaviors (Sloan et al., 2014), risk averting/loving behaviors (Mungan
and Klick, 2015), and behaviors induced by underlying psychological factors (van Winden
and Ash, 2012). All these studies can be viewed as endeavors towards understanding the
question of why certain individuals choose to commit crime under a particular deterrent
strategy, while others do not. From an economic standpoint, the answer to this question is
because the utility function of every individual is parameterized differently (see section 3.2).
In this work, we focus on mainly two important parameters {w, k}, wealth and discount
rate. We believe that these two parameters are strong indicators of criminal behaviors (see
section 4.2), and the distribution of the two parameters can be accurately measured within
a population (see section 6.1 and 6.2).
An important side note to mention here is that it is, in fact, possible for {w, k} to
fully specify the behavioral traits of the population under two possible scenarios. The first
scenario is when the pair {w, k} forms a complete basis for describing all possible utility
functions (Chajewska and Koller, 2000), meaning that all other behavioral traits can be
uniquely specified by the values of {w, k}. For example, it may be the fact the “reckless-
ness” of an individual (Arnett, 1992) is simply an expression of wealth and discount rate5.
An interpretation of this would be that if a person has a high discount rate, then he/she
may be more “reckless” in the sense that he/she will be prone to seek immediate rewards
at the sacrifice of future well-being. This is generally an unrealistic scenario, as it is rather
ridiculous to assume that the complexities of human behavior can be described by merely
two parameters.
The second, more realistic scenario is to relax the assumption that {w, k} has to fully
specify the behavioral traits of every member in the population, but we instead only require
it to describe the average behavioral traits of the population. Therefore, if other behavioral
traits are distributed among the population independently with respect to {w, k}, then the
general behavior of the population can be effectively predicted by {w, k} “on average”. As
an example, in section 6.2, we show empirically that the probability weighing factor γ,
describing the risk preference of an individual, is in fact distributed independently with
respect to {w, k}. In the end, if we wish to find the optimal penal strategy, we are only
interested in how the criminal behaviors across the entire population will respond to a
particular deterrent strategy (see section 4.2), so it is only required that we know how the
behavioral traits are distributed among the population (see section 4.4), meaning that it is
unnecessary to predict the response of every single member.
5. Note that the direction of causality may go the other way, meaning that it may just as well be that the
discount rate is just an expression of recklessness.
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2.4.1 Utility Function of the Offender
We first begin by assuming that all individuals are rational agents6. According to rational
choice theory, whenever an individual is faced with a decision among multiple choices, the
individual will select the one returning the highest utility gain (or lowest utility loss) for
him/herself. This theory also applies to the decision process of a potential offender who
weighs the expected return of the crime to decide whether to commit the crime or not. In
short, the individual will only choose to commit the crime if the perceived expected utility
gain is greater than zero. We can denote θ as the vector of parameters defining the utility
function of the individual (which we simply refer to as utility parameters from here on), and
denote φ as the current penal strategy. We let the utility gain returned from the crime be
B(θ), and the perceived expected disutility of the possible punishment be −D(θ,φ). The
individual will be deterred from committing the crime if the net utility gain of the crime is
negative, or
B(θ)−D(θ,φ) < 0.
Note that the utility parameters θ are different for every individual, so given a particular
deterrent strategy φ, the above inequality is satisfied for certain values of θ but violated
for others. Therefore, equation 2.4.1 (at equality) can be interpreted as a partition that
separates the population into offenders and non-offenders (see section 4.2 for a detailed
discussion for this partition).
As a simple example, we consider the case where the parameter θ is fully specified by
the discount rate k. Imagine a scenario where two individuals, Alice and Bob, are given the
opportunity to commit a crime with a guaranteed reward returning some fixed utility gain
b0. Alice has a small discount rate kA, and Bob has a large discount rate kB > kA. If the
crime is committed, there is some fixed change of being apprehended with the punishment
being a 24 hour imprisonment starting next week. According to equation 1, we see that
D(kA) > D(kB) (as kA < kB), which means that Alice perceives the disutility of the
punishment to be greater than what Bob perceives. Assuming that Alice is deterred from
committing the crime, then
b0 −D(kA) < 0 6=⇒ b0 −D(kB) < 0,
meaning that Bob won’t necessarily be deterred as well. Intuitively, what this means is that
a punishment delayed by a week for Bob may not present sufficient level of threat for Bob
than it does for Alice, so the deterrent strategy is not an effective strategy for Bob.
2.4.2 Utility Function of the Victim
A very crucial assumption here is that the offender is selfish in the sense that he/she seeks
only to maximize his/her utility function and disregards the utility loss for the victim. If
we denote the disutility of the victim as a result of the crime to be −L(θ) (where θ is the
6. The question of whether the assumption that all individuals are rational agents is valid or not is somewhat
meaningless in a mathematical sense, as all “irrational” behavior of an individual can be explained, or
made “rational” essentially, by a particular parameterization of the utility function such as his/her
discount rate, probability weighing, underlying psychological factors, etc.
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utility parameter for the victim), then we define total utility function to be the sum of the
utility functions of both parties of the crime (the offender plus the victim)
Btot(θ1,θ2) = B(θ1)− L(θ2),
where θ1 and θ2 are the utility parameters for the offender and victim respectively. Note
that the offender will act to maximize only B but not Btot. Therefore, a naive deterrent
strategy would be to set the expected disutility of punishment for the offender to be exactly
equal to the disutility of the victim as a result of the crime, or L(θ2) = D(θ1,φ), which
translates to the problem of solving for φ. Under this deterrent strategy, the offender im-
plicitly evaluates the disutility incurred on the victim, and would act indirectly to increase
the total utility function7.
This is a rather elegant solution, but it fails in mainly two respects. First, the solution
to the equation L(θ2) = D(θ1,φ) depends on the parameters θ1 and θ2. In other words,
a different deterrent strategy has to be implemented for each offender-victim pair, which is
neither practical nor fair, as it implies using some behavioral traits of the offender (which
may be poorly measured) as a discriminant for enforcing a particular punishment. Second,
even under the assumption that this strategy is possible and the total utility function Btot
between every offender-victim pair is maximized, the implementation of this strategy may
be very costly, with its cost outweighing the net increase in Btot. A general extension of this
analysis is presented in section 3.2, with the analysis being performed under a general social
welfare function which encapsulates the total utility functions of all the offender-victim pairs
as well as the cost of implementing the penal strategy itself.
3. General Model of Deterrence
At this point, it should be very clear that the problem of finding an optimal strategy is not
a trivial task, as it requires a simultaneous maximization the total utility function of each
offender-victim pair and minimization of the cost of implementing the strategy. As briefly
discussed in section 2.1, the problem can be defined as finding a strategy that maximizes the
social welfare function, which we define to be the sum of the total utility of every member
in a population. Note that the absolute social welfare function is very difficult to define
and measure (Fleurbaey, 2009), so we focus only on the relative change in the social welfare
function connected to the particular crime we are studying8, which we refer to as the relative
social welfare function. In this paper, the crime we are focusing on is the offense of driving
under influence, or DWI or short, then the goal is to find a penal strategy φ = {f, t, τ, p, r}
(see section 2.1) such that it maximizes the relative social welfare function of the crime of
DWI.
7. Note that under this model, a crime is justified as long as the net change in Btot is positive after the
offense. A commonly invoked example is when a poor offender steals from a rich victim, forcing a more
efficient distribution of wealth, as the marginal utility of a dollar for the offender is greater than that of
the victim.
8. This includes any victim’s loss associated with the crime, the cost that went into deterring this crime,
and the disutility resulting from the punishment of the offenders of this crime.
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3.1 Review of Old Model
The notion of formulating the problem of finding an optimal deterrent strategy in terms
of maximizing the social welfare function is not novel. A systematic formulation has been
developed by Gary Becker in his seminal paper which employs economic methods to deter-
mine the optimal probability and severity of punishment (Becker, 1968). However, there
are multiple problems that the original model failed to address, and we here point out the
three major ones.
First, the model assumes that the cost of enforcing the punishment scales proportionally
with the disutility of the punishment that the offender perceives. This is generally not
the case. For example, if we double the term of imprisonment, the cost of enforcing the
imprisonment may be doubled, but the disutility for the offender may not be due to the
presence of hyperbolic time discounting (see equation 1). Second, the model assumes that
the punishment is either a fine or imprisonment, and the offender does not have a choice
between the two. This assumption is rather problematic as it suggests the ideal strategy
being a fine of a very large sum of money, which would ideally deter all offenders while
costing very little (as the collection cost of fines is assumed to be small). In reality, a large
amount of fine is rather meaningless for individuals of low income, as they would not be able
to afford it anyway. A more realistic model will be to offer the offender the option to choose
between a fine, imprisonment, and other forms of punishments. Lastly, the model accounts
for the fact that an increase in the probability of apprehension and severity of punishment
will reduce the number of offenses. However, it does not offer a formulation that allows
for estimating exactly how many offenses would be deterred. Therefore, the optimization
problem formulated only exists on a theoretical level, and a closed form solution containing
variables that can actually be measured in a population does not exist.
3.2 Overview of New Model
In our model, we characterize the behavioral traits of each member with the utility parame-
ters θ (see section 2.4), and we attempt to describe the criminal propensity of a population
by the distribution of θ among a population (see section 4.4), which allows us to predict the
response of the population to a particular penal strategy. To be more specific, our model
is based on the assumption that a strategy will partition the population into offenders and
non-offenders (see section 4.2), and the social welfare function can be explicitly evaluated
over this partition, so the problem is converted in some sense to the optimal partitioning of
the population into offenders and non-offenders. In addition, the model also assumes that
the offender has the freedom to choose between multiple punishments, and for each possible
punishment, both the social cost of enforcement and the disutility incurred on the offender
is carefully considered (see section 4.3).
We first present a rigorous mathematical formulation of the relative social welfare func-
tion that can be constructed with respect to any class of crimes. The idea is to assume
every ordered pair of two members within a population to be a possible pair of offender and
victim. And under a specific deterrent strategy, we can divide all the pairings into two main
groups. The first group consists of pairings on which a criminal offense won’t be realized
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due to successful deterrence, and this group generates social benefits from the crimes not
occurring, which factor into the social welfare function as positive summation terms. The
second group consists of pairings on which the deterrence fails and the occurrence of crimi-
nal offenses is possible, and this group generate social costs associated with the enforcement
of punishments on the offenders, which factor into the social welfare function as negative
summation terms. The model is general but often times quite difficult to study, but in most
cases, simplifications can be made under reasonable assumptions justified under the crime
of interest (see section 4.1).
3.3 Opportunities and Offenses
To begin with, we define a population Ω to be a set (Enderton, 1977) whose elements ω ∈ Ω
are members making up the population. We define µ to be the counting measure operator
(Halmos, 2013) which returns the cardinality of a finite set, and we denote the size of the
population to be µ(Ω) = |Ω| = N . For every member ωi ∈ Ω, we can fully characterize the
member with its utility parameters θi.
We define a particular class of crime to be ζ. Given a crime ζ, and some time window
∆t, a directed graph (West et al., 1996) whose vertices are Ω is generated, with the arrows
representing a potential offender-victim pair. More specifically, the arrow (ωi, ωj) repre-
sents an opportunity for crime ζ with ωi being the offender and ωj being the victim. We
can model the arrival of opportunities at each edge to be an independent Poisson process
(Durrett, 2019) with rate 2λ, with the direction of the arrow being random. Therefore, the
expected number of opportunities presented to every member ωi ∈ Ω in the time window
∆t is approximately Nλ∆t9.
We denote a punishment to be δ, which is defined by the form10, the celerity, and the
severity of the punishment. We define the set of all possible punishments be ∆. In addition,
we define the probability of apprehension to be p ∈ [0, 1]. We can then express the penal
strategy as φ = (p, δ1, δ2, ..., δm), which is an (m+1)-tuple. Under this strategy, the offender
will be apprehended with probability of p and given m choices of punishment as specified
by δ1, δ2, ..., δm. The set of all deterrent strategies is then given by the Cartesian product
Φ = [0, 1]×∆m11.
3.4 Deterrence
Note that when opportunity arrives for an offeder ωi, the offender won’t necessarily take
the opportunity. The opportunity will only be realized and converted into an offense if the
net utility gain Uζ from committing the crime is positive for the potential offender under
9. Since the arrival of opportunities at each edge is a Poisson process with rate 2λ, the formation of an arrow
pointing from ωi to some other vertex is also a Poisson process with rate λ. Therefore, the formation
of an arrow pointing from ωi to any of all other N − 1 vertices is a sum of N − 1 independent Poisson
processes, with the expected value being (N − 1)λ∆t ≈ Nλ∆t for large N .
10. The form of the punishment can be a simple fine, imprisonment, community service, etc.
11. There are overlapping elements in the set Φ, as the penal strategy is not affected by the ordering of
(δ1, ..., δm). This means that there are m! elements in the set corresponding to the same strategy.
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the deterrent strategy φ. We can then write the condition for deterrence as
Uζ(θi,θj ,φ) = Bζ(θi,θj)− pi(p, γi)
{
min
δ∈φ
[
Dζ(θi, δ) + Sζ(θi, δ)
]}
< 0, (4)
where B denotes the utility that the offender ωi expects to gain from the crime ζ, which
is dependent on both θi and θj (the traits of the offender and the victim). pi(p, γi) is the
probability weighing function of the offender parameterized by γi. D+ S denotes the total
disutility that the offender expects to be incurred on him/her after apprehension, where D
denotes the disutility of punishment δ for the offender ωi
12; and S denotes any disutility of
being apprehended not directly resulting from the punishment (such as the stigma associ-
ated with being apprehended). For the rest of the paper, we refer to S simply as stigma
(Decker et al., 2015). Note that the individual will always choose the punishment incurring
the least disutility, hence the min function.
On the other hand, we can write the net gain/loss in the social welfare function as a
result of the offense to be
Vζ(θi,θj) = Bζ(θi,θj)− Lζ(θi,θj)
where −L(θi,θj) denotes the disutility incurred on the victim from the offense. Note that
the utility that the offender gains from the crime13 is taken into account as part of the
social welfare function (since the social welfare function must include the utility function of
the offender as well). This means the increase in the social welfare function as a result of a
crime not occurring is simply the inverse of V , or
−Vζ(θi,θj) = Lζ(θi,θj)−Bζ(θi,θj). (5)
3.5 Costs of Punishment
To model the social cost of implementing the deterrent strategy, we consider two separate
costs. The first cost is associated with the apprehension probability, which we can model
as a fixed cost that depends only on the apprehension probability, Cp(p), which we refer to
as the detection cost. And the second cost is associated with enforcing the punishment on
the offender, which depends on the form of punishment and also the two parties involved,
Cδ(θi,θj , δ). For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider any reformation effects as a re-
sult of the punishment (see section 4.1 for cases where this is approximately true). In other
words, we assume that the offender’s utility parameters will not be modified through deter-
rence, so there is no social benefit associated with the decrease in likelihood of recidivism
(Maltz, 1984). To study the social cost associated with the punishment more closely, we
consider the punishments of fine and imprisonment as examples. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the social cost of punishment depends only on the utility parameters of the
offender.
12. Note that Dζ is only present in the utility function of the offender if he/she is actually aware of the
deterrent strategy. See section 4.2.1 for a detailed discussion of the case where the offender is uninformed.
13. It is assumed that the utility that the offender actually gains from the crime is equal to the utility that
he/she expects to gain when evaluating his/her utility function before deciding to commit the crime
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3.5.1 Costs of Fine
We first consider the example of a simple fine, where the only cost associated with this pun-
ishment is the collection cost14 and the disutility is due to the offender’s stigma associated
with apprehension. We can then write the total social cost of using a fine as punishment as
Cδ(θi, f) = Cf + gSζ(θi, f), (6)
where f denotes the punishment of a fine, and Cf denotes the collection cost assumed to be
independent of the fine amount. We denote Cf to be the enforcement cost corresponding to
the cost of enforcing the punishment onto the offender. g > 1 is a prefactor translating the
offender’s stigma into the disutility incurred on the society. To see the reasoning behind this
prefactor and why it is greater than one, we can assume that the offender is a productive
worker, and this stigma prevents the offender from being fully productive in the future15.
We set the loss in the social utility (due to the deviation of the offender’s output from
his/her full capability) as gS, then we see that this value must be greater than the loss for
the offender in his/her potential compensation for his/her work, S16. We can denote gS as
the opportunity cost of the punishment, corresponding to the value (unrelated to the crime)
that the offender is otherwise able to create if he/she were not apprehended.
3.5.2 Costs of Imprisonment
We then consider the social cost of imprisonment. Note that besides the cost of having
the stigma associated with apprehension, we also have to consider social costs such as the
opportunity cost of keeping the offender in prison (instead of letting him/her work) for a
time period of τ , and also the social benefit of the offender not being able to commit any
more crime for the duration of his/her term of imprisonment. We can then write the total
social cost of using imprisonment as punishment as
Cδ(θi, I) = CI(t, τ) + g
[
Dζ(θi, I) + Sζ(θi, I)
]
+ λτ
∑
ωj
Vζ(θi,θj), (7)
where I denotes the punishment of imprisonment, and CI is the enforcement cost which
can be assumed to be a function of t (the delay in punishment) and τ (the length of
imprisonment), with an explicit expression of this cost given in equation 19. In addition
to the opportunity cost gS incurred after the period of punishment, gD can be interpreted
as the opportunity cost incurred during the punishment as a reuslt of the offender not
working for a time duration and τ plus any “discomfort” he perceives from the unpleasant
imprisonment environment17. The reasoning for the prefactor g is similar to the discussion
14. We are making the general assumption that the transfer of wealth from the offender to the collector is a
simple transfer of utility within the population, so it does not result in any utility gain/loss in the social
welfare function. This means that we are ignoring the effect of any inefficient distribution of wealth
(Coleman, 1979) that may result from this trasnfer, and the only cost associated with this transfer is
the cost of forcing this transfer itself.
15. This is due to the offender not being able to find a suitable job due to his/her criminal records.
16. This is because in a realistic economic model, the worker is only compensated with a fraction of his
output value, with the rest of the value being absorbed by the consumer and the company.
17. If we assume the presence of time discounting, then the social disutility as a result of imprisoning the
offender (D in equation 7) will be substantially different than the disutility that the offender perceives
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in the previous paragraph. And the last term denotes the social benefit of the criminal
opportunities not being realized as a crime for a time period of τ .
3.6 Population Partition
We first define the following set of all ordered pairs E = {(ωi, ωj) |ωi ∈ Ω, ωj ∈ Ω, ωi 6= ωj},
which corresponds to all possible offender-victim pairs. We may partition this set into
multiple subsets given a deterrent strategy φ = {p, δ1, ..., δm}. We denote the first subset
as E0 ⊆ E, which satisfies the following condition
∀(ωi, ωj) ∈ E0, Uζ(θi,θj ,φ) < 0.
In other words, when an opportunity is formed from ωi to ωj , the offense will not be
realized as the net utility gain for the offender is negative. The complement of this subset
E \ E0 denotes the set of pairs on which offenses will be realized, and it can be further
partitioned into m disjoint subsets, with m being the number of punishment options. For
every h ∈ [[1,m]], the subset Eh ⊆ E satisfies the following condition
∀(ωi, ωj) ∈ Eh, Uζ(θi,θj ,φ) ≥ 0 ∧ argminδ∈φ
[
D(θi, d)
]
= δh.
In other words, whenever an opportunity is formed from ωi to ωj , an offense will be realized
as the net utility gain for the offender is positive. Furthermore, when caught, the offender
will choose δh as punishment.
3.7 Social Welfare Function
We are now finally in the position to construct the social welfare function particular to the
crime ζ. We first zero the social welfare function to the welfare level corresponding to the
scenario where every criminal opportunity has been realized, and no deterrent strategy has
been implemented, then the problem of maximizing the expected social welfare function
with respect to all possible deterrent strategies φ is given by (where the subscript ζ is
assumed)
max
φ∈Φ
{
λ∆t
[ ∑
(ωi,ωj)∈E0
(− V (θi,θj))− p m∑
h=1
∑
(ωi,ωj)∈Eh
Cδ(θi,θj , δh)
]
− Cp(p)
}
, (8)
Note that φ enters implicitly in the expression through the partitioning of the set E and
the cost associated with the punishment of offenders Cδ.
In this form, the model is complete. However, this formulation is not useful in any
practical sense due to two reasons. First, in order for the optimization problem to be
defined, we have to specify the distribution of θ in the population Ω, otherwise there
(D in equation 4). To be more specific, the D in equation 7 will not be time discounted as it represents
actual social disutility, while the D in equation 4 will be time discounted as it represents the offender’s
perception of punishment. This discrepancy is very important if we were to use the discount rate k as
a parameter of θ when partitioning the population and evaluating the social cost of imprisonment (see
sections 4.2 and 4.3).
16
would be no way to “count” the number of members in each of the m + 1 partitions of
E. The second problem is that the optimization problem is not computationally feasible.
If we analyze the time complexity (Papadimitriou, 2003) of performing this optimization
brute force, the algorithm has to check all possible deterrent strategies, with the number
of operations scaling exponentially with m+ 118. Furthermore, given a penal strategy, the
partitioning of E requires N2 operations19. Therefore, the time complexity of a brute force
algorithm would be O(N2em+1), which presents a major computational challenge.
4. A DWI Case Study
As discussed in section 3.7, the general form of the optimization problem as appeared in
equation 8 is intractable from a computational standpoint. However, if we assume that
the optimization problem is performed in the context of a specific crime, many simplifying
assumptions can usually be made. In this section, we focus on the crime of DWI as an
illustrative case study.
4.1 Simplifying Assumptions
If we let the crime ζ be the class of DWI crimes, then there are several assumptions we can
make to simplify the optimization problem as given in equation 8, to the point where an
analytic approach is possible. There are two things to note. First, these assumptions are
not strictly necessary for the main results of the paper to hold. Second, alternative simpli-
fications can also be made depending on the crime of interest. We here make assumptions
that are justified particular to the crime of DWI.
We first state the seven assumptions that we make, followed by a detailed discussion of
the justification of these assumptions
• Assumption One: Every member can be fully characterized by his/her level of wealth
and discount rate.
• Assumption Two: The utility function of every member is static.
• Assumption Three: The probability weighing factor is constant for the population.
• Assumption Four: The utility gain from an offense for the offender is dependent
on his/her level of wealth, and the utility loss from an offense for the victim is fixed
in expected value.
• Assumption Five: The penal strategy is static and non-discriminatory is expected
value.
• Assumption Six: The opportunity cost of imprisonment, S+D, scales proportionally
with the offender’s level of wealth. In addition, the opportunity cost incurred during
the punishment, D, scales proportionally with the term of imprisonment τ .
18. This is assuming some sort of discretization of the set of all possible deterrent strategies Φ
19. This is because all edges have be to be checked, and the number of edges for a complete graph of N
vertices is N(N − 1) = O(N2).
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• Assumption Seven: The stigma associated with apprehension is independent of the
form of punishment.
Assumption one means that θ = {w, k} can be fully specified with two parameters,
where w denotes the level of wealth and k denotes the discount rate. We believe that these
two parameters describe well the criminal behaviors of a population (see section 2.2), and
can be easily measured within a population (see section 6). For an individual, the level
of wealth correlates strongly with the utility gain from committing DWI (to be discussed
shortly) and the opportunity cost of imprisonment (see section 3.5). The discount rate
governs how fast the disutility of punishment decays with its delay (see section 2.2). In
some sense, this pair of parameters allows us to determine the “level” of deterrence that the
member perceives from a penal strategy, allowing us to predict his/her response when given
a criminal opportunity. Furthermore, the disutility incurred on the member as a result of
the punishment can also be easily evaluated from the two parameters.
Assumption two means that the utility function of the individual does not evolve in
time, or at least in the time window in which the penal strategy is in effect. In the context
of DWI, this means that as long as the punishment of multiple offenses is equal to the
first offense, the offender won’t be less inclined to commit DWI even after an accident or
apprehension. In other words, recidivism is possible for the offender. Even if we were to
relax this assumption and allow the utility function of an offender to be modified after an
accident or apprehension, if we assume that the probability of accident or apprehension is
sufficiently small or the time interval between two consecutive DWI offenses is at the same
order as the penal strategy time window20, then the change in the utility function will only
account for a second order correction to the partitioning of the population, which we can
ignore.
Assumption three states that the probability weighing factor γ is the same for every
individual. Although this is not necessarily a realistic assumption (as seen in section 6.2), it
is crucial for the simplification of the optimization problem as the function pi(p, γ) is related
to γ in a highly nonlinear fashion (see equation 3).
Assumption four is a reasonable assumption in the context of drunk driving. When-
ever an individual decides to commit DWI, in the majority of cases, it is usually motivated
by the fact that the alternative of not committing DWI will result in some disutility scaling
positively with his/her level of wealth21 (Jacobs, 1989). Furthermore, it can be assumed
that probability and severity of the damages resulting from the DWI act is independent of
θ. To begin with, the purpose of performing DWI (unlike other crimes such as burglary) is
20. If the probability of accident or apprehension is small, then we are only mismodeling a small fraction
of the population whose utility functions are modified after the incident. Similarly, if the rate of DWI
offenses is small, then we can assume that the rate of change in the utility function is also small,
allowing us to make the static assumption (Ko lsos, 1970) in the time frame where the penal strategy is
implemented.
21. A typical example would be when a person decides to drive home from a bar after drinking, the corre-
sponding alternative would be to call a taxi and pick up his/her vehicle the next day, and the time spent
doing so will result in the decrease of total productivity correlated positively with his/her current level
of wealth
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not for the forceful transfer of wealth from the victim to the offender, so there is no reason
to assume that the expected disutility incurred on the victim will depend on the utility
parameters of either party22. This allows us to set the expected loss to the victim to some
fixed amount.
Assumption five means that the probability of apprehension and punishment choices
are the same for every offender regardless of his/her θ. However, DWI incidents may result
in varying level of damages, ranging from minor damages such as running into a pole to
serious damages such as killing a pedestrian. The punishment obviously has to be discrim-
inatory towards the level of damages to be in accordance with criminal justice, meaning
that offenders whose DWI act resulted in severe damages should be punished more severely.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the last paragraph, the expected damage is fixed for every θ,
so we can also make the assumption that the expected punishment will also be the same
every θ. This implies that the enforcement cost of the punishment should be constant in
expected value.
Assumption six states that the total loss in the value of the offender’s labor output
(as a result of imprisonment) scales proportionally with his/her level of wealth. This is a
fair assumption as a member’s level of wealth should act as a strong indicator of his/her
rate of productivity. And since the total value of output is simply the rate of productivity
multiplied by the time period, it can also be assumed that the opportunity cost incurred
during the imprisonment period scales proportionally with the term of imprisonment.
Assumption seven implies that the negative effects of having a DWI record itself is
the same regardless of punishment options that the offender chooses. This makes sense
because the severity of the crime itself should be the only substantial characterization of
the criminal background of the offender, and the form of punishment (or even the severity
of punishment) should play little role in affecting the future prospect of the offender.
Under these assumptions, equations 4 and 5 simplify to
Uζ(θi,φ) = Bζ(θi)− pi(p)
{
min
δ∈φ
[
Dζ(θi, δ)
]
+ Sζ(θi)
}
< 0
Vζ(θi) = Bζ(θi)− Lζ
(9)
respectively, noting that the functions are independent of θj , or the victim’s utility pa-
rameters. And this allows for considerable simplification for the social welfare function in
equation 8.
For further simplification, we can assume that a fine and imprisonment are the two only
punishment options ∆ = {f, I}, or δ1 = f and δ2 = I. The the social welfare function can
22. The involvement in a car accident is generally unintentional, with the probability and severity of damage
correlated with the ability of the driver to operate the vehicle under influence, which can be reasonably
assumed to be independent of θ. The damage can be set fixed in expected value, which is simply the
expected damage of the car accident weighted by the probability.
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be reduced to
Nλ∆t
[ ∑
(ωi,ωj)∈E0
(− V (θi,θj))− p m∑
h=1
∑
(ωi,ωj)∈Eh
Cδ(θi,θj , δh)
]
− Cp(p)
∼
∑
ωi∈Ω0
(− V (θi))− p ∑
wi∈Ω1
Cδ(θi, f)− p
∑
wi∈Ω2
Cδ(θi, I)− Cp(p)
Nλ∆t
(Divide by Nλ∆t)
=
∑
ωi∈Ω0
[
L−B(θi)
]− p ∑
ωi∈Ω1
[
cf + gS(θi)
]
−p
∑
ωi∈Ω2
{
CI(t, τ) + g
[
S(θi) +D(wi, τ)
]− λτN[L−B(θi)]}− Cp(p)
Nλ∆t
(10)
where the domain of optimization φ ∈ Φ and the subscript ζ is assumed. To understand
this reduction, First, we first realize that neither the summands nor the partitions depend
on ωj (the victim) anymore, so the summation over ωj is factored out to give us a prefactor
of ∑
ωj 6=ωi
= µ(Ω)− 1 ≈ N.
Since the partition depends only the offender ωi, we can define the partition over the
vertices Ω instead of the pairs E23. We then denote the three subsets as {Ω0,Ω1,Ω2}24,
with the number of subsets being 3 = 1 + 2 as there are only two choices of punishments
(fine or imprisonment). Recall that this optimization problem is over five parameters φ =
{p, f, t, τ, r} (see section 2.1), which is still somewhat computationally expensive. We show
in the following sections how we can reparameterize the penal strategy to better specify the
partitioning of the population (section 4.2), and how certain assumptions can be assumed
to reduce the optimization to its asymptotic form (section 5.2).
4.2 Population Partition
There are several factors that enter the mindset of a potential offender performing DWI.
The first is simply the utility gain from the crime itself, which we can assume to scale
proportionally with his/her level of wealth (see 4.1)
B(θ) = bw,
where b is denoted as the scaling factor. Recall that the probability of apprehension is
p, which the offender evaluates to pi(p), and the offender has the choice between a fine or
imprisonment. For a fine, we can denote the disutility to be f , and for imprisonment, we
can write its disutility magnitude as (see equation 1)
I(w, k, t, τ) =
rw
k
log
[
1 +
kτ
1 + kt
]
, (11)
23. The partitioning is defined through the first equation in 9, which is only dependent on ωi.
24. Ω0 corresponds to non-offenders. Ω1 corresponds to offenders choosing a fine over imprisonment. Ω2
corresponds to offenders choosing imprisonment over a fine.
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where the expression is scaled with w. Recall that τ is the length of imprisonment, and t is
the time of the delay in punishment.
If we model the stigma as −sw, then the member will be deterred from committing a
DWI offense if the following is satisfied (see equation 4)
U(w, k) = bw − pi(p)
{
min
[
f, I(w, k, t, τ)
]
+ sw
}
< 0, (12)
where we’ve applied the assumption that the incurred stigma is independent of the form of
punishment (hence why the min function is only over f and I). The above inequality can
be expressed equivalently as
w <
pi(p)f
b− pi(p)s ∧
k
log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] < pi(p)r
b− pi(p)s. (13)
If we denote
w0 =
pi(p)f
b− pi(p)s, (14)
then the first condition can be written as w < w0. And since k/ log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
]
is a
monotonously increasing function with respect to k, there must be only one solution to
the second condition in equation 13 at equality, which we can denote as k0
25. Then simi-
larly, we are allowed to write the second condition as k < k0.
We then see that in order for an individual to be deterred, its level wealth must be below
w0 and its discount rate must be below k0. We then say that the penal strategy is targeting
a wealth level of w0 and a discount rate of k0. This defines the first subset of population
Ω0 (see section 3.2), which we term the non-offenders. We can interpret the subset Ω0
as consisting members whose level of wealth is sufficiently low to be deterred by a fine of
amount f , while simultaneously having a sufficiently small discount rate to be deterred by
an imprisonment length of τ (delayed by t). Note that given a strategy targeting w0, the
amount of fine is specified by
f =
w0
[
b− pi(p)s]
pi(p)
.
And given a strategy targeting k0, the pair {t, τ} must be related as follow
τ = (eψk0 − 1)( 1
k0
+ t), (15)
where the ψ is defined as follow
ψ =
b− pi(p)s
pi(p)r
. (16)
An important side note to mention is that in a realistic population sample, there should
always be some positive infimum to the set of wealth levels which we can denote as wm, or
inf{w |w ∈ Ω} = wm > 0.
25. Note that no analytic expression of k0 exists at k0 is the solution to a transcendental equation.
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Figure 1: A visual representation of the partitioning of population under a penal strategy
targeting {w0, k0}. The green rectangle, on the lower left, represents the population deterred
from committing any crime. The red trapezoid, on the right, represents the offenders that
will choose a fine over imprisonment. The blue trapezoid, on the top, represents the offenders
that will choose imprisonment over a fine. Color in print.
This assumption is necessary to account for some minimal wage standard of the society,
and to make it mathematically possible to model the wealth distribution as a Pareto dis-
tribution (Arnold, 2014), for which there must be a positive lower bound to the domain
of the distribution (see section 4.4). We then consider a possible strategy where the tar-
geted wealth level is smaller than the minimum wealth level, or w0 < wm. In this case,
every member would be an offender (or the non-offender subset, Ω0, would be empty), as
the disutility of the fine is too small to deter a member of even the lowest level of wealth.
For the sake of optimization, we don’t have to consider this strategy as this strategy only
incurs enforcement cost, but does not return any social benefit as none of the members are
deterred by the strategy.
The offenders are members in the population for which the penal strategy fails, and
the set of offenders can be denoted as the complement of the set of non-offender, or Ω/Ω0.
The set of offenders can be further partitioned into two subsets depending on whether the
offender chooses a fine or imprisonment after being apprehended. The partition can be
expressed as a curve on the w − k coordinate system on which the members are indifferent
towards the two punishment options. This is done by simply taking the two arguments of
the min function in equation 12 to be equal, which gives us
f = I(w, k, t, τ) =⇒ w = kf
r log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] . (17)
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The above equation defines a curve in the w− k coordinate system dividing the population
into two regions. On one side of the curve, the population prefers a fine over imprisonment;
we denote this subset as Ω1. On the other side of the curve, the population prefers impris-
onment over a fine; we denote this subset as Ω2. We call this curve the partition curve.
See figure 1 for a visual representation of the partition. Note that the offenders choosing a
fine over imprisonment have a relatively low discount rate and high level of wealth, and the
offenders choosing imprisonment over a fine have a relatively high discount rate and low
level of wealth.
In most cases, we can approximate the partition curve as a straight line
w
k
≈ w0
k0
, (18)
noting that this expression does not depend explicitly on {t, τ}. See appendix B for a discus-
sion on how the approximation is carried out. The partitioning scheme is then completely
defined by the pair {w0, k0} (see figure 1), which provides a huge simplification from the
original 5 degrees of freedom of the penal strategy {f, t, τ, p, r}. From equation 15, we see
that given k0 and t, τ can be uniquely specified, so the deterrent strategy can be alterna-
tively parameterized as φ = {p, w0, k0, t, r}. The purpose of using {w0, k0} as parameters
is to reduce the complexity of the optimization problem by allowing the boundaries of the
partitions to be easily described by the two parameters (see section 4.4).
4.2.1 Uninformed Members
The majority of the analysis performed in this section can be easily extended to model the
population that is uninformed of the law (Kaplow, 1990). If a member is uninformed, then
he/she is unaware of the deterrent strategy, thus the total disutility Dζ will be absent from
his/her utility function, which gives us
U(w, k) = (b− pi(p)s)w.
We can make the simplifying assumption that b > s (meaning that the utility gain from
the crime is always greater than the stigma associated with apprehension), then the utility
function is strictly positive. Therefore, the uninformed member will always choose to com-
mit the crime given the opportunity.
This means that the uninformed members won’t contribute to the subset Ω0, since all
of them are assumed to be offenders. However, when apprehended, an uninformed member
would be given the same choices of punishments (as an informed member would be), so
the partitioning between Ω1 and Ω2 still applies to the uninformed population exactly as it
would for the informed population.
4.3 Social Welfare Function
Recall from section 3.2 that given a particular strategy φ, the social welfare function can be
written as the social benefit gained from the deterred crimes under the strategy minus the
detection cost and social cost of punishment (which is further broken down into enforcement
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cost and opportunity cost).
We first focus on the social benefit of deterred crimes. Whenever an individual commits
an offense, a loss is usually incurred on the society. Using equation 9, we expressed the
expected utility gain/loss of the society after an offense to be
V (w) = bw − l
where bw is the increase in utility of the offender, −l is the expected disutility incurred
on the victim (assumed constant). If we zero the utility function to be when all criminal
opportunities are realized and no penal strategy is in effect (see section 3.2), then the utility
gain/loss of the society after an offense being deterred is simply the inverse of V , or
−V (w) = l − bw.
We now consider the costs associated with implementing the strategy. We first look
at the detection cost, which we can assume to scale proportionally with the probability of
detection
Cp(p) = cpp,
where cp is the scaling factor
26.
Lastly, we consider the social costs of the punishments. From equation 6, we see that
the social cost of using a fine as punishment can be written as
cf + gws,
where cf is the fixed collection cost and gsw is the opportunity cost. Similarly, from equation
7, we write the social cost of using imprisonment as punishment as
Ci(t, τ) + gw(s+ rτ)− λτN(l − bw),
where gw(s + r) is the opportunity cost of imprisonment, and λτn(l − bw) is the social
benefit of the offender not being able to commit crimes for a time duration of τ . For the
enforcement cost Ci(t, τ) of imprisonment, we require that
∂tCi < 0 ∂τCi > 0,
which implies that the cost increases with duration of imprisonment and decreases with the
length of delay27. A possible cost model of Ci(t, τ) that satisfies the two conditions above
26. A more realistic cost model for the probability of apprehension would be Cp(p) = cp log
[
1
1−p
]
(Note that
this expression diverges for p = 1, corresponding to the fact that certain apprehension is not possible in
reality.) The derivation of this cost model is based on the fact that the failure of apprehension should
decay exponentially with the number of “checkpoints”, which should scale proportionally with the cost.
However, for p 1, this can be approximated with Cp(p) ≈ cpp.
27. The reason why we assume that the enforcement cost decreases with the length of delay is an empirical
assumption. Consider a scenario where the punishment of imprisonment is enforced with a delay rather
than being immediate, then the party enforcing the punishment will have sufficient time to better allo-
cate the resources necessary for the enforcement, so that the enforcement will be performed in a more
economically efficient fashion. In addition, there should also be the legal cost associated with sentencing
the offender, and we can assume that the cost to increase with the rate at which the legal process is
carried out.
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can be written as
Ci(t, τ) = c0 +
ct
mt
+ cττ (19)
where c0 is some fixed cost of enforcing the punishment that does not depend on t or τ .
ct
mt can be interpreted as the “celerity” cost of the punishment that scales inversely with t.
The choice of using ctmt as the “celerity” cost is for analytic convenience and is not entirely
realistic, though the exact choice of the celerity cost model does not alter the major results
of this work28. And cττ is the “severity” cost which scales proportionally with the duration
of imprisonment τ .
Putting everything together, we see that the total social costs associated with each
punishment option (fine and imprisonment) can be written as
Cδ(w, t, τ, δ) =
{
cf + gsw if δ = δ1
c0 +
ct
mt + cττ + gw(s+ rτ)− λτN(l − bw) if δ = δ2,
(20)
where δ1 is associated with the punishment of a fine, and δ2 is associated with the punish-
ment of imprisonment. Therefore, equation 10 can be expressed explicitly as∑
Ω0
(l − bw)
−p
∑
Ω1
(cf + gsw)
−p
∑
Ω2
[
c0 +
ct
mt
+ gsw + (cτ − Λl)τ + (gr + Λb)wτ
]
−cpp
(21)
where we’ve denoted Λ = Nλ. Note that the prefactor Nλ∆t is ignored and simply absorbed
into the constant cp
29. At this point, we have accomplished two major task. The bounds
of the summation indices (or the population partition in the w − k space) are uniquely
specified by {w0, k0} (see 4.2), and the summands are expressed in terms of {p, t, τ, r} (with
t and τ constrained as equation 15). However, to perform the summation, we still have to
know exactly how {w, k} is distributed among each subset {Ω0,Ω1,Ω2}. In other words, we
have to define the measure over which the summation is performed (Halmos, 2013). This
is done in the immediately following section, by assuming a distribution of {w, k} over the
population.
28. In this work, we are only interested in the asymptotic scaling behavior of the social costs of imprisonment
(see appendix C) with respect to k0, which should be at least exponential regardless of celerity cost
model we use (as long as ∂tCi < 0). To see this, simply consider a cost model without celerity cost, or
Ci(t, τ) = c0 + cττ , which should give us the best scaling with respect to k0 (as it does not incur any
additional cost to decrease the delay in punishment). We simply set t = 0, then from equation 15, we see
that τ = (eψk0 − 1)/k0 scales exponentially with k0, which implies that Ci must also scale exponentially.
Therefore, for any celerity cost model satisfying ∂τCi < 0, the social costs of imprisonment must scale
at least exponentially with k0 as well.
29. This gives us cp =
cp
Nλ∆t
, which can be interpreted as the cost of apprehension per unit probability, per
unit time, per unit population, per unit criminal activity.
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4.4 Modeling the Distribution of Traits
The optimization can be made simpler if we approximate the counting measure as a proba-
bility measure scaled by the total population N(1+ ), where  accounts for the uninformed
population30. In other words, the number of members with traits {w, k} can be approxi-
mated as
N × f{W,K}(w, k) dw dk,
where f(w, k) can be interpreted as the “density” of population with traits {w, k}. If we
further assume that w and k are distributed independently (with an empirical justification
presented in section 6.3), then f(w, k) can be factorized as
f{W,K}(w, k) = fW (w)fK(k).
We can model the distribution of wealth, fW (w), as a Pareto distribution (Arnold, 2014)
with the domain being w ∈ (wm,+∞), where wm is the minimum wealth level of the
population
fW (w) =
αwαm
wα+1
FW (w) = 1− (wm
w
)α. (22)
In addition, we can model the distribution of discount rate, fK(k), as a zero-inflated
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exponential distribution (Lambert, 1992)
fK(k) = (1− ρ)δ(k) + ρ 1
β
exp(−k
β
) FK(k) = (1− ρ) + ρ
[
1− exp(−k
β
)
]
, (23)
where δ is the Dirac Delta function32 (Arfken and Weber, 1999), which accounts for the
phenomenon that the majority of the population is expected to have a discount rate close
to zero (meaning that most people are “rational” in time). The parameter ρ is the fraction
of population with non-zero discount rate, and β is the mean discount rate among that pop-
ulation. The form of this distribution is justified with empirical measurements in a sample
population of size 207 in section 6.1, where it is shown that the discount rates of the sam-
ple is well fitted by this distribution, and the estimators for {ρ, β} from the sample are given.
Having now modeled the distribution of {w, k}, we now give the explicit form of the
social welfare function in integration form. For the sake of convenience, we first denote the
following ratios
u =
k0
w0
=
km
wm
v =
km
k0
=
wm
w0
. (24)
30. It is assumed that the distribution of {w, k} over the informed and uninformed population will be the
same.
31. Note that the use of the term “zero-inflated” is not technically valid, as the model is a continuous
distribution instead of a discrete one. The term is rather used to denote the fact a large probability
measure is concentrated at k = 0.
32. The Dirac Delta function δ(k) is a function that evaluates to zero everywhere except at k = 0, at which
it is undefined. However, the Dirac Delta function has a well-defined integral which evaluates to one,
or
∫∞
−∞ δ(k) dk = 1. Alternatively, δ(k) can be interpreted as a distribution that generates a probability
measure that is completely localized at k = 0. The use of δ(k) is for the convenience of modeling the high
concentration of probability measure at k = 0. Its use is not strictly necessary. In fact, any distribution
that generates a high concentration of probability measure close to k = 0 would suffice
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Under the assumption that w0 > wm > 0, or equivalently v ∈ (0, 1), the social welfare
function can be approximated as follow
Ω0 →
∫ w0
wm
∫ k0
0
(l − bw) f(w, k) dk dw
Ω1 → − p
{∫ ∞
w0
∫ uw
0
(cf + gsw) f(w, k) dk dw + 
∫ ∞
wm
∫ uw
0
(cf + gsw) f(w, k) dk dw
}
Ω2 → − p
{∫ ∞
k0
∫ k/u
wm
Cδ(w, t, τ, δ2) f(w, k) dw dk + 
∫ ∞
km
∫ k/u
wm
Cδ(w, t, τ, δ2) f(w, k) dw dk
}
− cpp,
(25)
where again, we are ignoring the prefactor of N by absorbing it into the constant cp (see
section 4.3) and the expression for the social costs of imprisonment, Cδ(w, t, τ, δ2) is given in
equation 20. A visual representation of the bounds of the integrals is given in figure 1. Note
that at this point, the optimization problem is completely well defined over the parameters
{p, w0, k0, t, r}, and the following section will be devoted to solving this optimization through
a combination of the techniques of further reparameterization and asymptotic analysis.
5. Solving the Full Optimization Problem
In this section, we perform an explicit optimization on the social welfare function. Even
though the tools used for performing the optimization contains certain mathematical tech-
nicalities, there is a central concept that can be readily understood on an intuitive level.
In short, we show that the pair {f, r} (the fine amount and the harshness of imprisonment
condition) is able to together induce an interesting phase transition on the optimal penal
strategy. Section 5.1 provide an informal discussion of the concept of phase transition which
originates from statistical physics (Me´zard et al., 1987). In short, we show that when r is
above a certain threshold (or when the imprisonment condition is sufficiently harsh) and
f is below a certain threshold (or when the amount of fine is sufficiently small), then the
social welfare function favors a penal strategy with a very severe term of imprisonment;
otherwise, a severe term of imprisonment is not favored.
5.1 Phase Transition
The term phase transition (Me´zard et al., 1987) is mainly used in physics to commonly de-
scribe the transition between different states of matter such as from solid to liquid (melting)
or from liquid to gas (boiling). We here make no attempt to formally define the concept
of phase transition as it is not completely relevant to our main points of discussion. In
fact, we use the term phase transition very loosely in the context of penology to describe
the phenomenon where when certain penal parameters cross a threshold, the space of re-
alizable33 penal strategies experiences a sudden change. This is analogous to the natural
phenomenon where as a thermodynamic parameter (such as temperature) crosses a thresh-
old (Prigogine et al., 1961), the state of the matter changes discontinuously (such as water
33. A realizable penal strategy means one that can be implemented without an excessively large amount of
social cost
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boiling at 100 degrees). Here, our “thermodynamic parameter” are {f, r}, and when it
crosses a certain threshold, the value k0 at the optimal penal strategy rises abruptly to an
extremely high value, corresponding to the phenomenon where a severe strategy suddenly
becomes favorable.
5.2 Reparameterization of the Social Welfare Function
Note that in section 4.4, we assumed that the factorization of the pdf of {w, k} is possible, or
f{W,K}(w, k) = fW (w)fK(k). This means that the integrals over f{W,K}(w, k) (see equation
25) can also be factorized as separate integrals over w and k, which allows for considerable
simplification. If we denote the integral corresponding to subset Ωi as Ji (meaning that the
social welfare function can be written as J0 − pJ1 − pJ2 − cpp), then we find the following
closed form expressions for the three integrals (where the denotations in equation 24 are
applied)
J0 = (1− ρe−κ0)
[
l(1− vα)− α
α− 1bwm(1− v
α−1)
]
J1 = cf
{
vα
[
1− αρEα+1(κ0)
]
+ 
[
1− αρEα+1(κm)
]}
+ gs
{ α
α− 1(v
αw0 + wm)− αρ
[
vαw0Eα(κ0) + wmEα(κm)
]}
J2 = ρ
[
c0 +
ct
mt
+ (cτ − Λl)τ
] {
e−κ0 − vακ0Eα(κ0) + 
[
e−κm − κmEα(κm)
]}
+ ρ
α
α− 1
[
gs+ (gr + Λb)τ
]
wm
{
e−κ0 +  e−vκ0 − (vκ0)α−1
[
Γ(2− α, κ0) + Γ(2− α, vκ0)
]}
where the following denotations are made
κ0 =
k0
β
κm =
km
β
.
Note that Eα(x) denotes an exponential integral and Γ(2−α, x) denotes the upper Gamma
function with their respective integrals (an asymptotic approximation) given by
Eα(x) =
∫ ∞
1
e−tx dt
tα
≈ e−x(x−1 − αx−2)
Γ(α, x) =
∫ ∞
x
tα−1e−t dt ≈ xα−1e−x[1 + (α− 1)x−1]
28
The integrals can then be further reduced by applying these asymptotic approximations
J0 = (1− ρe−κ0)
[
l(1− vα)− α
α− 1bwm(1− v
α−1)
]
J1 ≈ cf
{
vα
[
1− αρe
−κ0
κ0
]
+ 
[
1− αρe
−vκ0
vκ0
]}
+ gs
{
vα−1wm
[ α
α− 1 − αρ
e−κ0
κ0
]
+ wm
[ α
α− 1 − αρ
e−vκ0
vκ0
]}
J2 ≈ ρ
[
c0 +
ct
mt
+ (cτ − Λl)τ
] {
(1− vα)e−κ0 + αvα e
−κ0
κ0
+ α
e−vκ0
vκ0
}
+ ρ
α
α− 1
[
gs+ (gr + Λb)τ
]
wm
{[
(1− vα−1)e−κ0 + (α− 1)vα−1 e
−κ0
κ0
+ (α− 1)e
−vκ0
vκ0
]}
.
If we look at the optimization problem above, we immediately note that the pair {t, τ}
appears only in the expression of J2. In other words, they only contribute to the social cost
of enforcing imprisonment as the punishment. This means that the optimization over {t, τ}
can be done independently for J2 to reduce one degree of freedom as a preliminary for the
full optimization to be performed.
In appendix C, we discuss in detail how this optimization is performed, and show that for
a given penal strategy targeting κ0, the optimal delay in punishment t decays exponentially
with κ0 and the length of imprisonment τ scales exponentially with κ0. This means that
both the celerity and severity of punishment has to increase exponentially with the target
discount rate κ0, which agrees with our intuition. The minimum social cost of imprisonment
J2 decays exponentially with κ0, with the asymptotic rate of decay being
ψβ
2
− v < 0, (26)
where the expression of ψ is given in equation 16.
Note that if the condition 26 is satisfied, then the social cost of imprisonment J2 decays
to 0 for κ0 →∞, and the social cost of a fine J1 converges to some fixed value. If we further
assume that
ct
m
[
cτ − Λl + (gr + Λb)wm
] c2f ,
which essentially means that the social costs of imprisonment is much greater than that of
a fine, then it can be easily seen that the maximum of the social welfare function can be
approximated by taking κ0 → ∞, corresponding to a very severe term of imprisonment.
On the other hand, if the condition 26 is not satisfied, then J2 diverges for κ0 → ∞, so
the maximum of the social welfare function is at some intermediate value of κ0. In other
words, the condition 26 can be interpreted as the threshold between a severe and mild term
of imprisonment.
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Note that in most practical scenarios, condition 26 can be easily satisfied (see sections
5.3 and 6.4). For the sake of simplicity, we then assume in this case where 26 is satisfied
and take κ0 →∞, which reduces the social welfare function to
J0 − p(J1 + J2)− cpp
=l(1− vα)− α
α− 1bwm(1− v
α−1)− pcf (vα + )− α
α− 1pgswm(v
α−1 + )− cpp.
(27)
Note that are left with only two parameters {v, p}, comparing this to the original five
φ = {p, f, t, τ, r}. This is a much simpler optimization problem and can be approached
analytically. But before we proceed with solving this problem, we first have a closer look
at the condition 26 and see what it implies for the penal strategy.
5.3 Threshold for Phase Transition
Note that by plugging in the expression for ψ in equation 16, condition 26 becomes
v >β
b− pi(p)s
2pi(p)r
. (28)
In addition to the above condition, v and p also have to be within the real interval [0, 1]34.
Therefore, we see that in order for condition 28 to be satisfiable for v, p ∈ [0, 1], the inequality
must hold for {v, p} = {1, 1}, which implies that
1 > β
b− s
2r
=⇒ r > (b− s)β
2
. (29)
This means that the harshness r must be at least (b−s)β2 , where we recall that β is the
mean discount rate of the population, and b − s is the difference between the utility gain
of the offense and the stigma of apprehension (per unit wealth). We see that the harshness
must scale proportionally with b − s. To interpret this, note that if b − s is positive, it
means that the stigma of apprehension alone is not sufficient to deter the offender from
committing DWI. Furthermore, the larger this difference is, the more “prone” to DWI the
offender would be, so the harshness of the imprisonment condition r must increase accord-
ingly to “match” this difference, such that its presence in the offender’s utility function is
prominent enough to achieve the deterrent effect. In addition, note that β is the mean
discount rate of the population. For a population with a large β value, we can interpret
this as the population being generally “reckless”, so naturally, we must also increase the
harshness of the imprisonment condition to match the level of recklessness of the population.
To express condition 28 in the original parameters of the penal strategy, we plug the
ratio v = wmw0 and the expression for w0 (equation 14) into inequality 26, which gives us
f <
2rwm
β
, (30)
34. Note that p denotes a probability, so p ∈ [0, 1] by definition. Recall that v = wm
w0
in equation 24, and
w0 > wm > 0, implying that 0 < v < 1.
30
Phase Transition
Fine
Harshness(b-s)β/2
Ph
as
e S
ep
ara
tio
n
Severe
Strategy
Mild
Strategy
Figure 2: Note that the optimal strategy experiences a very abrupt transition from a
strategy having a small k0 value (a mild term of imprisonment) to a strategy having a high
k0 value (a severe term of imprisonment). The transition occurs when the harshness of the
imprisonment condition increases above a certain threshold r > (b−s)β2 , and the amount of
fine decreases below a certain threshold f < 2rwmβ . Color in print.
which implies an upper bound on the amount of fine. Recall that wm denotes the minimum
level of wealth among the population, and β denotes the mean discount rate among the
population with non-zero discount rates. Note that
I(wm, β, 0, (2e− 1)β−1) = rwm
β
log
[
1 + ββ−1(2e− 1)] = 2rwm
β
, (31)
which is the disutility of an immediate imprisonment of length (2e − 1)β−1 incurred on a
member of {wm, β} (minimum level of wealth, and mean discount rate). This means that f
has to be small enough such that when the option of a fine of amount f and an immediately
imprisonment of length (2e − 1)β−1 is presented to this member, the member will choose
a fine over imprisonment. Although the derivation of this bound is rather non-trivial, the
intuition behind the need to limit the fine amount is clear. If the amount of fine is too
high, then the majority of the population will opt for imprisonment instead. And if there
is an overabundance of offenders choosing imprisonment over a fine, and this makes it un-
favorable to implement a strategy with a severe term of imprisonment, as the social costs
of imprisonment (scaled with the number of offenders choosing imprisonment) will diverge.
In short, we see that if r increases above some threshold (equation 29) and f decreases
below some threshold (equation 30) dependent on r, then theoretically speaking, then it is
favorable to implement a severe term of imprisonment (see figure 2), as the social costs of
imprisonment will be contained. Note that in the case where k0 is infinite, we essentially have
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a penal strategy where a fine is the effectively the only punishment option, as no rational
agent would choose to be imprisoned infinitely long35, so the optimization problem reduces
to finding the optimal amount of fine and probability of apprehension, as the punishment
of imprisonment is now inconsequential.
5.4 The Optimal Amount of Fine
The condition 28 at equality can be interpreted as a curve in the v − p plane, and the pair
{v, p} must be related as follow on the curve
vc(p) = β
b− pi(p)s
2pi(p)r
or pc(v) = pi
−1( bβ
2vr + sβ
)
. (32)
If inequality 29 holds, then the region defined by condition 28 corresponds to a region at
the upper-right corner of the square [0, 1]× [0, 1] in the v−p coordinate system. The region
is bounded by the right and top edges of the square and the curve defined by equation 32.
We then see that the smallest v value in this region is at the intersection of the curve and
the top edge, or p = 1, which gives us
vmin = β
b− s
2r
.
Similarly, the smallest p value is at the intersection of the curve and the right edge, or v = 1,
which gives us
pi(pmin) =
bβ
2r + sβ
Recall from section 5.2 that the optimization problem is to find the pair {v, p} such that
the following function is maximized
J(v, p) = l(1− vα)− α
α− 1bwm(1− v
α−1)− pcf (vα + )− α
α− 1pgswm(v
α−1 + )− cpp
To have a better understanding of the structure of the problem, we write J only with terms
that depend only on v and p respectively and ignore any prefactors
J(v) ∼ vα−1
{ α
α− 1(b− pgs)wm − (l + pcf )v
}
J(p) ∼ −p
{
cp + cf (v
α + ) +
α
α− 1gswm(v
α−1 + )
}
.
(33)
We note that the term in the large bracket for J(p) is always positive, so we see that for
a fixed v > vmin, the maximum of J(p) is attained for the smallest possible value of p, or
pc(v) (see equation 32).
35. There is the caveat here that in reality, the effective term of punishment can never be infinite as it is
bounded above by the expected lifespan of the offender. Therefore, it may still be a possibility that
the individual would choose imprisonment over fine if the fine is sufficiently large. However, given the
constraint in 30, we see that this is not a possibility in most practical cases, so the assumption of an
infinite term of punishment is justified.
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The case for J(v) is less trivial. Note that given some p > pmin, we find that the local
maximum of J(v) is attained at
vo(p) =
(b− pgs)wm
l + pcf
or po(v) =
bwm − lv
gswm + cfv
, (34)
where po is simply the inverse function of vo. Note that vm(p) <
bwm
l < 1
36. However, note
that v is bounded below by vc(p) (see 32), so we see that the global maximum is attained
at (see appendix D)
v∗(p) = max
[
vc(p), vo(p)
]
= max
[(b− pgs)wm
l + cfp
, β
b− pi(p)s
2pi(p)r
] (35)
or equivalently
f∗(p) = min
[2wmr
β
, (
b− pi(p)s
b− pgs )(
l + cfp
pi(p)
)
]
,
which gives us the optimal fine amount for some given probability of apprehension. Note
that if we let p = 1 for the sake of simplicity, we see that that the second argument of the
min function is reduced to
(l + cf )(
b− s
b− gs)
meaning that the fine amount should scale positively with the loss incurred on the victim
from the crime and the collection cost of the fine. This makes sense intuitively, if the vic-
tim’s loss and collection cost is high, it is necessary to set the fine amount higher as well to
reduce the number of offense thus the collection cost.
Perhaps it is less obvious why the fine amount should scale negatively with g, or the
ratio between the total value of a member’s output over his/her compensation (see section
3.5). To interpret this, note that for a large g value, the offender is only evaluating a small
fraction of the opportunity cost of imprisonment37, so in some sense, the deterrent effect of
imprisonment is small relative to the social costs that it incurs. Therefore, imprisonment
becomes a less cost-effective strategy in the sense that the ratio between the deterrent effect
and its social cost is low, so it is necessary to set the amount of fine to be sufficiently small
such that it becomes the effective strategy instead (as the majority of the population will
choose a fine over imprisonment).
36. Note that It can be reasonably assumed that this value is smaller than 1. Otherwise, we have bwm > l,
meaning that we have the trivial case where even for the poorest members, the utility gain returned
from the offense is greater than the cost incurred on the victim. This means that the social cost of the
crime would be far too low to justify any form of penal strategy.
37. This is because the offender is only seeing a small fraction of his productivity in his/her income, and
fails to consider the other fraction which is converted to social utility gain.
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5.5 Optimal Probability of Apprehension
Now that we have found the maximum over v for every p, the optimization problem essen-
tially reduces to an one variable optimization problem over only p ∈ (pmin, 1]
p∗ = argmaxp∈(pmin,1]
[
J(v∗(p), p)
]
,
which can be done fairly quickly with any numerical solver. As expected, the optimization
of the probability of apprehension presents the only non-trivial part of the optimization
problem from a computational standpoint. Furthermore, we see that in order to solve this
problem, it is necessary to specify the probability weighing factor γ in the function pi(p), as
the argument v∗(p) (see equation 35) depends explicitly on pi(p).
5.5.1 Special Case
Note that under a certain condition, an analytic expression for the optimal {v, p} pair is
possible. In appendix E, we show that if the following condition is satisfied
po(1) ≥ pmin or bwm − l
gswm + cf
≥ pi−1( bβ
2r + sβ
)
,
then the optimum is attained at
v = 1 p = pmin = pi
−1(
bβ
2r + sβ
) .
Note that v = 1 implies that w0 = wm, or
f =
2rwm
β
,
which is exactly at the phase transition threshold (see equation 30).
6. Empirical Measurements
Note that the social welfare function is only defined if the distribution of the utility func-
tion parameters θ is given for the population, otherwise there would be no knowledge of the
expected numbers of offenders and non-offenders under any penal strategy (see section 4.2),
making the optimization impossible. In other words, for our model to have any practical
application, it is necessary to device a method where the utility function parameters θ can
be accurately measured for any member, and the distribution parameters (see section 4.4)
can be accurately estimated.
In this section, we discuss how the method of survey can be used as an effective tool
to study empirically the distribution of θ among the population. As a proof of concept,
we created a short survey and distributed it among 207 participants in mainland China
through an online platform, Wenjuanxing, to ensure that we are uniformly sampling across
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all income brackets, age groups, and regions38. Even though the sample size used in the
study is relatively small, we were still able to obtain an accurate measurement of the dis-
tribution of the parameters θ that our work requires. And in the future, we will extend
this empirical study to capture a larger sample size, so that the distribution of θ can be
measured more accurately.
Note that the distribution of wealth w should be well-determined (as the government is
assumed to have a database containing the income of every member of the population), so
the goal is to set up the survey questions to specifically measure the distribution of {k, γ}
(the discount rate and probability weighing factor), which are parameters that cannot be
inferred from any database of information on the population. In section 6.1, we show that
the distribution of k in our sample in fact resembles the zero-inflated exponential distribu-
tion as assumed in section 4.4, and we report the confidence intervals of the two parameters
{β, ρ}. Similarly, in section 6.2, we show that the distribution of γ in our sample resembles
a normal distribution, and we report the estimators of the mean and variance {µγ , σγ} from
the sample. Note that in addition to the error that enters when we estimate the distribu-
tion parameters from the samples, we also have to consider the error associated with the
inaccurate responses of the participants. To take into account the errors at both stages, we
constructed novel regression models which will be discussed in extensive details in appen-
dices F and H.
In addition to the measurements of the {k, γ} distributions. In section 6.3, we show that
the triple {w, k, γ} are pairwise independent. The independence of {w, k} is of particular
importance as it is one of the core assumptions in the construction of our model which
allows for the factorization of the pdf f{W,K}(w, k) = fW (w)fK(k) (see section 4.4). And
in section 6.4, we show how the quantity r (the harshness of imprisonment condition) can
be measured within a population. The measurement of r is crucial as it is one of the two
parameters {f, r} that induces a phase transition for the optimal penal strategy (see section
5.3).
6.1 Distribution of Discount Rates
Recall from equation 23 that the distribution of discount rates among a population is
assumed to be
fK(k) = (1− ρ)δ(k) + ρ 1
β
exp(−k
β
).
We attempt to estimate the parameters ρ and β from the sample population by measuring
the discount rate of each member. The technique is to provide the participant with a hypo-
thetical scenario where he/she has been apprehended due to DWI and are forced to make a
38. It is of course very difficult to ensure that our samples are unbiased, as the distribution of population
conditioned on having access to internet is by no means an accurate representation of the entire distribu-
tion. However, this is not a major problem if the parameters of interest is independent of the parameters
biased by our sample selection. For example, we show in section 6.3 that the discount rate k and level of
wealth w are distributed independently. This means that even if our sample does not faithfully capture
the number of members in each income bracket, it does not necessarily mean that our sample of discount
rates will be biased as well.
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choice between an immediate punishment of a certain length and a delayed punishment of
a longer length. The participant is then asked at least how long the punishment has to be
delayed in order for him/her to choose the delayed punishment over the certain punishment.
Note that unlike previous studies (Loughran et al., 2012), a measurement of the partic-
ipant’s propensity, e.g. using the Likert scale (Boone and Boone, 2012), towards a delayed
punishment over an immediate punishment (where the parameters of both punishment op-
tions are fixed) does not suffice for the purpose of estimating the discount rate. In order
to estimate the discount rate accurately, the exact point of indifference has to be measured
between an immediate punishment of time τ0 and a delayed punishment of time τ1 delayed
by t, where the participant him/herself has to specify at least one of the three parameters.
It is decided that τ0 and τ1 should be fixed parameters while t should be measured as the
response. This results in the following natural formulation of the survey questions
Given the choice between an immediate punishment of 2 hours and a delayed punishment of τ ,
I would prefer a delayed punishment if the delay is at least t.
(36)
where τ = {2.5, 4, 10, 20} is a fixed vector for every participant, corresponding four alterna-
tive terms of imprisonment. For every τ , we request the participant to input a corresponding
value of t, which gives us four values of t39. Note that the disutility incurred on the offender
from imprisonment, or I(w, k, t, τ), is specified in equation 11, so we can determine k by
setting the disutility of the delayed punishment equal to that of the immediate punishment
of 2 hours
I(w, k, 0, 2) = I(w, k, τ, t) =⇒ t = 1
k
(
τ
2
− 1).
This results in an equation where k can be uniquely specified given some pair of {t, τ} where
τ > 2. Note that both t and τ are measured in hours, so the unit of k is hr−1.
Of course, to perform regression analysis, we have to assume some error term in the
above equation, and require more than one data points for accurate estimates of β and ρ.
Since in the survey the participant is given the option to specify t either in days, weeks,
months, or years, it is natural to assume that the error of t scales with t itself. In other
words, a large value of t gives rise to a greater uncertainty. Therefore, we should introduce
a multiplicative error (Firth, 1988) associated with t, or
t(1 + ) =
1
k
(
τ
2
− 1), (37)
where  is assumed to be a normal random variable (RV) of zero mean. This is a rather
unusual model40, and it presents some difficulties in performing error analysis, which we
39. Technically, the number of t measurements is at most four. It is possible that the participant refuses to
accept an imprisonment of length τ regardless of the delay, so it would be meaningless to measure t for
any imprisonment length above τ . This may result in the number of t measurements being less than 4.
See appendix F for a detailed discussion of how this is handled.
40. The regression model that we use here is novel, as we assume some multiplicative error term that is not
log-normal. This gives rise to an interesting relationship between the standard error of the estimator
and the estimated error term variance. A complete treatment of this topic is given in appendix F.
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discuss in appendix F.
For now, we simply state the unbiased estimator (Draper and Smith, 1998) of k for
a participant (which we prove to be in fact unbiased in appendix F). If we assume that
participant i has a discount rate of ki, and responded with a minimal delay of tij to question
corresponding to the imprisonment length τj (see question 36), then the unbiased estimator
of k is given by the following average of ratios
kˆi =
1
m
m∑
j=1
τj
2 − 1
tij
,
where m is simply the number of imprisonment options. Note that in the case where the
participant responded with tij =∞ corresponding to some value of τj (meaning that he/she
will not choose an imprisonment of length τj under any condition of delay), then we can
naturally treat this ratio as being 0. The standard error for the estimator of kˆi is rather
complicated, and we will discuss in greater detail in appendix F.
Assume now that the number of participants is n, then we have a sample of k =
{k1, k2, ..., kn} measured from the participants from which we can use to estimate the ρ and
β parameters of the zero-inflated exponential distribution (see equation 23). The natural
thought would be to use the fraction of non-zero k values as an estimator of ρ, and the
mean of these values as an estimator for β, or
ρˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(ki 6= 0) βˆ =
[ n∑
i=1
1(ki 6= 0)
]−1 n∑
i=1
kˆi,
where 1 denotes the indicator function (Folland, 2013) which evaluates to 1 if its argument
is true and 0 otherwise. We show in appendix F that these estimators are in fact unbiased,
and provide a discussion on constructing the confidence interval for the two estimators.
We provide here an intuitive discussion of the origin of the difficulty of the regression
analysis. The main point to note here is that the error in the constructed distributed is
propagated in two stages. At the first stage, the error comes from the response of the
participant (see equation 37), resulting in an error attached to the estimator kˆi for each
participant i. At the second stage, when we use all the values of kˆ measured from the
entire sample to construct the probability distribtion fK(k), there must also be errors asso-
ciated with the distribution parameter estimators {βˆ, ρˆ}, just simply as a result of sampling
statistics (Durrett, 2019). In the regression analysis, the errors in two stages are convoluted,
which is the main source of complexity for performing error analysis.
The distribution of the discount rates is presented as a histogram in figure 3, with the
β and ρ estimators reported as
βˆ = 0.00431± 0.00004 hr−1 ρˆ = 0.6587± 0.0370
The distribution is sampled from 164 out of the 207 participants, where the participants
who chose not to answer this section of questions are excluded. Note that the distribution
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Figure 3: This histogram shows the distribution of probability weighing factors among a
population sample of size n = 164. The bin width of the histogram is wb = 0.02. Note
that there is a large concentration of zero discount rates, and the distribution of non-zero
discount rates is well fitted with an exponential function (scaled appropriated with the bin
width and number of samples). The fraction of non-zero discount rates is estimated to be
ρ = 0.6585 ± 0.0370, and the mean discount rate estimated from the non-zero samples is
β = 0.00431 ± 0.00004 (hr−1). The uncertainty corresponds to an one-sigma interval, the
derivation of the standard error is given in appendix F. Color in print.
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is dominant near zero, and the tail of the distribution is well fitted by an exponential
distribution, which justifies the assumption that fK(k) follows a zero-inflated exponential
distribution (see section 4.4).
6.2 Probability Weighing Factor
Recall in equation 3 that the probability weighing function can be expressed as follow
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ ,
where the probability weighing factor γ is assumed constant for all members of the popula-
tion. In reality, this assumption is not accurate as the probability weighing factor γ actually
varies among the members of the population41. In fact, we show that the distribution of γ
among a population follows closely a normal distribution.
The probability weighing factor γ is measured using the concept of certainty equiva-
lent (Vose, 2008). Imagine the scenario where an individual is given a choice between an
uncertain reward with some probability of being realized and a guaranteed reward. If the
individual is indifferent between the two rewards, then the guaranteed reward is denoted as
the certainty equivalent of the uncertain reward. In the context of deterrence, an individual
would be indifferent towards committing the crime and not committing the crime if the net
utility gain from the crime is exactly zero, or
B − pi(p)
[
S +D
]
= 0 (38)
where S denotes the stigma associated with apprehension and D is the disutility of the
punishment (see section 3.2). Therefore, given some probability of apprehension, we say
that the certainty equivalent of committing the offense (and facing the risk of being caught)
is to give up on the offense and forfeit the potential reward of amount B. To see how the
probability weighing factor can be measured with the concept of certainty equivalent, we
first rewrite equation 38 as follow
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ =
B
S +D
. (39)
To determine the value of γ for a participant, we have to measure one of the three
parameters, {B,S,D}, corresponding to different values of p. For example, to determine γ
uniquely, one possible option is to make at least three measurements of D corresponding
to three different values of p42 (Khalil, 2002). To perform the measurements, we can place
the participant in a scenario where he/she may be tempted to commit the offense under
some level of apprehension probability p. Then the participant is asked to respond with the
41. Note that this fact does not affect the previous analytic results of the optimal penal strategy, under the
condition that the distribution of γ and {w, k} are roughly independent.
42. The reason three data points is required is because there are three unknowns in the system of equations
{γ,B, S}. Of course, this is only a necessarily condition to solve for γ, as there are cases where the
system of equations gives no solutions (such as when the measured values of D somehow increase with
increasing p, which violates the property of pi(p) being a monotonously increasing function.)
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amount of fine that is sufficient to deter him/her from committing the offense43 (thus giving
us a measure of D). Note that if we choose to make the measurements on D, then we have
three unknowns to determine, {γ,B, S}, which is slightly problematic for non-linear re-
gression analysis (see appendix H) as there are three regression coefficients to estimate, and
this requires many data points to achieve sufficient accuracy (Motulsky and Ransnas, 1987).
To reduce the degree of freedom in the problem, we note that the number of unknown
coefficients can be reduced to two if we realize that S and D appear in additive form on
the right hand side in equation 39 (and appear no where else). This means that the two
coefficients can be effectively combined into one, or simply S +D, so an alternative option
is to not measure S or D at all and perform measurements on B instead. Of course, it is
very difficult to measure B under regular condition as there seems to be no way to have
the participant quantify the utility gain from the DWI offense. As an example, consider
the case where an offender commits DWI by drunk driving back home late night for the
purpose of not wanting to miss work tomorrow, the utility gain of “not missing work” (or
the opportuntiy cost of missing work) is obviously difficult to quantify, as it depends on
many factors that cannot be controlled by the survey (such as how lenient his/her boss is).
Fortunately, under the unique technological context of mainland China, there is a clever
way which we can convert this utility gain into an exact dollar amount. To be more specific,
in mainland China, there is a prevalent mobile application, Didi, which allows the user to
request a designated driver with a very short wait time. This makes the measurement of B
much easier for us as it allows us to set the utility gain from the crime equal to the amount of
money that would be saved from not requesting the Didi service44 (or the opportunity cost
of not committing DWI). In other words, we say that the certainty equivalent of facing the
risk of apprehension by committing DWI is to instead spend an amount of B on requesting
a designated driver. To measure this certainty equivalent, we formulate the survey question
as follow
Given that the probability of apprehension is p and the fine is 500 RMB45,
I would choose to request a designated driver if the cost does not exceed RMB.
(40)
where the participant is asked to fill in the blank with a dollar amount based on his/her
preference. Note that in this hypothetical scenario, we also specified that the driver is
guaranteed to arrive under 2 minutes, as to minimize the opportunity cost associated with
43. Note that theoretically speaking, this can also be done the other way. In other words, we can ask the
participant given some fine amount, what level of apprehension probability is sufficient to deter him/her
from committing the crime. However, note that giving a response in terms of probability is usually much
harder than giving a response in a dollar amount, with the latter being a much more ubiquitous object
in daily life.
44. This is of course under the assumption that for the participant, there is no intrinsic value to the activity
of performing DWI itself. In other words, we are assuming that the participant does not receive any form
of psychological stimulation from performing DWI, meaning that he/she would not choose to commit
DWI “for no reason”. Of course, this assumption breaks down in reality, as there exists offenders who
derive pleasure from performing DWI, and this psychology constitutes a major factor in their evaluation
of utility function. However, in this study, we find that only 2 out of the 207 participants responded
that they derive pleasure from DWI, so for the purpose of our empirical analysis, we choose to ignore
this fraction of population.
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Figure 4: This histogram shows the distribution of discount rates among a population
sample of size n = 97. The bin width of the histogram is wb = 0.02. The distribution of
the probability weighing factor is fitted under a normal distribution (appropriately scaled
with the number of samples and bin width). The mean of the distribution is estimated to
be µγ = 0.6132± 0.0100, and the standard deviation of the distribution is estimated to be
σγ = 0.0706 ± 0.0105. The uncertainties of the estimators correspond to their one-sigma
intervals. See appendix F for a discussion of how the confidence intervals of the estimators
are constructed. Color in print.
the wait time, so that the uncertainty in the measurement of B is reduced. Recall that by
directly measuring B, the number of regression coefficients decreases from 3 to 2, with the
2 coefficients being {S +D, γ} (see appendix H).
The values of p used in constructing the hypothetical scenarios are fixed by the vector,
p = {0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98, 1}, (41)
for every participant. We see that the probability of apprehension ranges from unlikely
(or 5%) to certain (or 100%). For participant i, if he/she responds with Bij for a given
probability of apprehension pj , we then construct the following model relating Bij to pj
Bij − pi(pj , γi)(Si +Di) = ij , (42)
where ij is an independent normal error term with mean 0 and variance σ
2
i , with the
variance being a variable that depends on the participant. This model presents a non-linear
regression problem where the goal is to find an unbiased estimator γˆi for the probability
weighing factor of the individual, and construct its corresponding confidence interval (see
appendix F for a detailed discussion of the regression model). Using the estimators of γ
41
evaluated for all participants, we then construct the distribution of γ values among the
population. We assume that the distribution is normal with mean µγ and variance σ
2
γ , with
the explicit expressions for their estimators and standard errors given in appendix H. The
distribution of γ is presented as a histogram in figure 4, with the µγ and σγ estimators
reported as
µγ = 0.6132± 0.0100 σγ = 0.0706± 0.0105.
Note that similarly to the discussion in section 6.1, this model presents much difficulty in
regression analysis as the error is propagated in two stages.
It is interesting to note that since Si +Di enters as a regression coefficient in equation
42, the value of Si +Di can be estimated for each member, and we can compute the value
of Si as a “by-product”. To find the value of S, we assume D = 500 RMB to be the utility
loss of each member from the fine, and simply subtract it off the estimator of Si+Di. Since
the value of Si is not of major interest to this study, we simply report the median value of
the estimators of S from the samples, which is S˜ = 68.2 RMB.
6.3 Pairwise Independence of {w, k, γ}
In section 4.4, a major assumption that we made is that the wealth level and discount rate,
{w, k}, are distributed independently among a population. In this section, we extend this
assumption further and show empirically that the triplet {w, k, γ} are in fact pairwise inde-
pendent46. To show the independence of two variables, we split the samples at the median
of one of the variables and show that the distributions of the other variable in the two
groups agree within uncertainty. Note that in this analysis, w is quantified by the reported
income of the participant47.
To be more specific, consider that we have n samples from RVs A = {A1, ..., An} and
B = {B1, ..., Bn} (where Ai and Bi correspond to the same sample). We can reorder the
samples by performing some permutation on the indices (Dummit and Foote, 2004) such
that the samples are split at the median of A48. To be more specific, if we denote the
permutation as σ, then the following is require
∀i ≤ bn
2
c [Aσ(i) < A˜],
46. Theoretically speaking, pairwise independence does not imply mutual independence (Durrett, 2019), but
this distinction is usually very subtle in most practical scenarios.
47. Assuming that the actual level of wealth is some function of an individual’s salary. Then for a population,
showing the independence of the distribution of some behavioral traits with respect to salary also implies
independence with respect to the level of wealth. This is because functions of two independent RVs are
also independent RVs themselves (Durrett, 2019).
48. The reason why we choose the median is because we wish to split the data points into two groups, such
that the errors of the estimators (which we assume to scale inversely with respect to the square root
of the sample size, or ∼ 1√
n
) are in some sense “distributed equally” between the two groups, so that
there are no excessive errors in any of the groups. This is for a more accurate analysis and is not strictly
necessary. Note that however, this is not a form of median test (Brown et al., 1951), as the median is
not used to characterize the distributions of the two groups but serves rather as a grouping condition of
the samples.
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where A˜ denotes the median of the samples A. We can then split the samples B into two
groups
Bα = {Bσ(1), ..., Bσ(bn
2
c)} Bβ = {Bσ(bn
2
c), ..., Bσ(n)},
where the elements in the two samples may not be exactly equal. In particular, it is pos-
sible for |Bβ| > |Bα| if n is odd. For the sake of the example, let’s say we know that B is
normally distributed (with mean µB and σB) and the goal is to show that it is independent
of A. We then find the sample means and variances of the two groups Bα and Bβ, {µˆα, σˆα}
and {µˆβ, σˆβ}, and show that they agree respectively between the two groups within their
confidence intervals (Hansen, 1982). The analysis can also be done in the other direction
(splitting data points at the median of B and compare of the sample means and variances
of A for the two groups). Note that this procedure is rather general, and should apply not
only to normally distributed RVs but also other distributions as well49, assuming that the
distribution is well-behaved. In some sense, the goal is to retain the null hypothesis that
the distribution parameters of the two groups are the same, hence implying that A and B
are independent RVs.
To show the pairwise independence of {w, k, γ}, we have to check the three possible
pairings of the parameters separately. To check the independence of {w, k}, we split the
samples at the median salary of the sample, and show the distributions of k among the
“wealthy” and the “poor” are the same (see the top left histogram in figure 5). Note that
the difference between the two ρ values corresponds to a z value of 1.66, which is still small
enough for the null hypothesis to be retained50 (Newey and McFadden, 1994). Similarly,
to check the independence of {w, γ}, we again split the samples at the median salary, and
show the distributions of γ among the two groups are the same (see the top right histogram
in figure 5). Finally, to check the independence between {k, γ}, we split the samples at the
median k value, and show the distributions of γ among the two groups are the same (see
bottom histogram of figure 5).
It should be noted that we did not opt to perform standard hypothesis rejection tech-
niques (Newey and McFadden, 1994) which is rather difficult to be extended to account for
two-stage errors (see the discussion in section 6.1). Instead, it makes much more sense to
just compare the distribution parameters directly between the two groups, as the method
for constructing the confidence intervals of these distribution parameters has already been
developed in the previous two sections (section 6.1 and 6.2).
49. In some sense, this is similar to an ANOVA test (Scheffe, 1999) between two variables (where normality
is not assumed) where we essentially “transform” one of the variables into a categorical variable where
the categorization condition for the sample is based on its location relative to the sample median. Unlike
ANOVA, however, the goal is not only reject the hypothesis that the means of the two groups are
different, but the hypothesis that any of the parameters characterizing the underlying distribution is
different, which is usually a much stronger condition.
50. By some standards, this z value is actually large enough for one to reject the null hypothesis that the
distributions of k in the two groups are equal. However, even if we assume that ρ is dependent on
the level of wealth, this does not matter too much for the analysis carried out in section 5.3, as the
asymptotic behavior of the social welfare function for large k is governed by the mean of the exponential
distribution fK(k), or
1
β
, and we see that the values of β agree very well between the two groups.
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Figure 5: Top left figure: the distributions of the discount rates among two groups split
at the median salary of the sample. Top right figure: the distribution of the probability
weighing factors among two groups split at the median salary of the sample. Bottom figure:
the distribution of the probability weighing factors among two groups split at the median
discount rate of the sample. Note that in all three cases, the distribution parameters of
the two groups (reported on the corresponding histograms) agree well with each other.
The largest difference is the ρˆ values (reported in the top left figure) of the k distributions
between the wealthy and poor, corresponding to a z value of 1.66. Color in print.
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6.4 Measuring Harshness of Imprisonment
In equation 30, we express the phase transition threshold as
f <
2rwm
β
.
Therefore if we can somehow measure the value of r for a population, then we have ef-
fectively determined the upper bound of f for the optimal penal strategy. To measure r
implies that we need to quantity how the population perceives the imprisonment condition.
At first, this seems to be a rather intractable task as there is no obvious way for the partic-
ipant to express the harshness of the imprisonment condition in terms of some well defined
utility; however, we see that it is not necessary for the participant to quantify r directly if
we can map the imprisonment punishment to some other punishment option which we can
attach an exact dollar figure to.
Therefore, the natural thought would be to locate the point of indifference between a fine
and imprisonment for each member. Recall from equation 17 that the point of indifference
can be expressed as
r =
kf
w log[1 + kτ1+kt ]
. (43)
This equation means that when a member is given the choice between a fine of f and an
imprisonment of length τ delayed by t, the member would be indifferent between the two
punishments. Note that for every member of the population, the discount rate k can be
measured using the method described in section 6.1, and the level of wealth can be inferred
from the reported salary figure. In the case where k = 0 for a member, we can take the
limit of equation 43 as k → 0
lim
k→0
kf
log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] = f
τ
.
Now, the task that still remains is to determine the triple {f, t, τ}.
This is done indirectly through the following pair of survey questions:
1. Given that the probability of apprehension is 0.02%
and the punishment is a fine of 500 RMB,
I would request a designated driver if the cost does not exceed RMB.
2. Given that the probability of apprehension is 0.02%
and the punishment is an immediate detention.
If the cost for requesting a designated driver is (the response to Q1),
I would request a designated driver if the length of detention is greater than hours.
(44)
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Note that the first question is given as one of the questions used to measure the participant’s
probability weighing factor (see section 6.2). To see how this pair of questions locates the
point of indifference for the member, consider the following equation system{
B − pi(p)[f + S] = 0
B − pi(p)[I(w, k, t, τ) + S] = 0, (45)
where S is the stigma associated with apprehension (which we can assume to be unknown
even though it can be easily measured as shown in section 6.2). The first equation corre-
sponds to the first question, where f is given to be 500 RMB, and B is the utility gain from
the crime, which as discussed in section 6.2, is simply the price of requesting a designated
driver. And this dollar amount is given as the participant’s response in the first question.
The value of B is then carried over to the second question, as the response from the first
question is used as part of the question statement for the second question. From the second
question, we can obtain the value of τ as the maximum length of imprisonment that the
member can tolerate (while setting t = 0 as the punishment is immediate). Note that the
two equations implies
f = I(w, k, 0, τ), (46)
which is simply the equation for the point of indifference as appeared in equation 4351. In
some sense, we are locating the point of indifference indirectly through two separate scenar-
ios where the two punishment options are equated to a third quantity B, or the utility gain
from the crime. And equating the two punishment options to a third quantity guarantees
the equality of the two options themselves52.
Going back to equation 43, we see that f = 500 RMB is already given as a fixed amount
in the questions, t = 0 is set zero as the punishment is immediate, and τ is given as the
participant’s response to the second question. This allows us to determine r uniquely if we
assume w to be the reported salary of the participant. Then, we can solve for r
r =
{
kf/
[
w log(1 + kτ)
]
if k > 0
f/(wτ) if k = 0,
51. Note that equation 45 implies equation 46, but the reverse is not true. A clear way to see this is to
note that the solution to equation 45 is the point of indifference for three options: committing the crime,
accepting a fine, and accepting. It corresponds to the point where all three subsets {Ω0,Ω1,Ω2} meet
(see figure 1). On the other hand, the solution to eqution 46 is simply the point of indifference for two
options: accepting a fine and accepting being imprisoned, but it is not the point of indifference between
committing the crime or not. In other words, this means that the RHSs of the two equations in 45 do not
have to equate to zero, meaning that B doesn’t have to be set as the certainty equivalent of committing
the crime.
52. Note there are two reasons why we do not equate the two punishments directly by asking a question such
as: Given the punishment options of a fine of amount f , I would prefer to be imprisoned instead if its
length does not exceed hours. The first reason is that we need to have some structural consistency in
the survey questions so that the participant does not become easily confused by any structural disorder,
and asking a question where two punishment options are directly given (instead of just one) necessarily
breaks this structural flow. The second reason is that by assuming that the offender is already appre-
hended and forced to choose one of the two punishment options, we are constructing a scenario that may
be unrealistic to the participant, so the response given may not be a faithful representation of his/her
behavioral traits.
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noting that the unit of r is in hr−1. We measure r using this method for every member,
and find the median value of r of the sample to be
r˜ = 0.0505 hr−1.
This result, combined with the estimate of the mean discount rate βˆ = 0.00431 in section
6.1, allows us to compute the upper bound of the fine amount to be
f <
2rwm
β
= wm(2× 0.0505
0.00431
) ≈ 23wm.
In other words, from this empirical analysis, we see that the amount of fine must be below
23 times the minimum income in the population in order for a severe penal strategy to be
effective. One can see that this condition is usually satisfied in most of the penal strategies
that are currently being implemented.
7. Extensions
Up to this point, the main theoretical framework and empirical analysis have been fully
discussed. We here provide a brief discussion of some further generalizations and possible
extensions that can be made to our study, and give a few examples of how other classes of
crimes (other than DWI) can be effectively studied under this model.
7.1 Utility Function Factorization
Our model of social welfare maximization is dependent crucially on knowing how the param-
eters of the utility function are distributed among a population. It is well known that given
a full utility function, there are multiple decompositions possible (Chajewska and Koller,
2000). In particular, there should be a particular decomposition of the full utility function
into multiple independent parameters which can be studied. In this work, we focused on the
three parameters {w, k, γ} (wealth, discount rate, and probability weighing factor) as we
believe they are extremely crucial components of the utility function while being relatively
easy to measure among a population. Even though we have shown that the three parame-
ters are distributed independently, there is no reason to assume that these parameters form
a complete basis (Greub, 2012) for describing the full utility function. In other words, for
a finer description of the utility function, we have to explore the contributions of other
factors such as genetics, society, and religion. Not only that, but an investigation on how
the distribution these parameters among a population can be measured is crucial.
7.2 Dynamic Criminal Activities
Furthermore, in section 3.2, our model assumes only two-body interactions of crimes, and
that the appearance of opportunities on each edge is an independent Poisson process with
constant rate. There are multiple generalizations that can be made for the model to capture
more realistic and interesting scenarios. First, the most natural generalization is to have to
model account for crimes that involve more than two parties (such as arson), which can be
described formally as a hypergraph53 (Bretto, 2013).
53. A hypergraph is a graph whose edges can connect any number of vertices.
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Second, to capture the effect of distance in criminal activities, we have to note that
an opportunity is more likely going to arise in areas close to the offender than in areas
far from the offender (Warren et al., 1998). We can then define naturally an Euclidean
graph (Pach, 1999) with the vertices corresponding to the rough locations of the members
of the population, and the length of an edge corresponding to the distance between the
two member. We can then set the rate at which criminal opportunities arise between
two members to decrease with distance. For example, we can set the rate λ to decay
exponentially with distance, or
λζ(ωi, ωj) = e
−ad(ωi,ωj),
where a is some decay factor, and d(ωi, ωj) denotes the distance between member ωi and ωj .
Lastly, it is also possible to model the rate λ as a dynamic variable which varies in
time. This can be used, for instance, to capture the phenomenon of revictimization, where
a victim of some particular crime in the past is more likely to be victimized again in the
future (Fergusson et al., 1997). If we denote N(ζ, ωj) as the number of times that the
member ωj has been a victim of crime ζ in the past, then we can, for example, model the
rate of opportunities connecting from any member ωi to ωj to scale logarithmically
54 with
N(ζ, ωj), or
λζ(ωi, ωj) = a+ b log
[
N(ζ, ωj) + c
]
,
Of course, it is possible to make the model as convoluted as we can, but this comes at the
expense of analytic tractability. To achieve a balance between the two, the model should
be complicated enough to realistically capture the crime of interest, but also simple enough
such that non-trivial properties can be derived.
7.3 Burglary
In section 4.1, we made the simplifying assumption that the utility gain from the crime for
the offender scales proportionally with his/her wealth level, which results in a simple parti-
tion of the population into three groups (see figure 1). This assumption is only particular to
the crime of DWI, where it is assumed that the motivation behind committing DWI is the
opportunity cost of otherwise not doing so, and the opportunity cost scales proportionally
with the offender’s level of wealth. This assumption is not necessarily justified for all classes
of crimes. A simple example would be the crime of burglary, where the utility gain from
the crime is independent of the level of wealth of the offender (as the dollar value of items
that the offender obtains from the crime should not depend on how rich the offender is55).
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that the utility gain is a constant B, and the
probability of apprehension is 1, then the utility function of the individual can be written
54. Note that we don’t assume a linear scaling as this would imply an exponential growth in criminal
activities, which is clearly not realistic.
55. However, if we assume that the utility function scales logarithmically with the amount of money that
an individual has (Markowitz, 1952), then the marginal utility gain of a dollar for an individual scales
inversely with his/her current level of wealth, in contrast to the DWI crime where the utility gain from
the crime scales proportionally with the offender’s level of wealth.
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as (refer to equation 4)
B −min [f, I(w, k, t, τ)].
One can immediately note that when f < B (or if the amount of fine does not exceed the
value of items that the offender can potentially obtain from the crime), then the utility
function will be positive, and an offense will always be realized whenever an opportunity is
presented, so the partition Ω0 will always be empty. Similar to the case where w0 < wm for
a penal strategy targeting DWI (see section 4.2), this results in a strategy that only incurs
social costs but does not result in any benefit in the form of criminal deterrence.
Let’s then only consider the non-trivial case where f > B, then in order for a member
to be deterred, his/her utility gain from the crime must be negative, or
B < min
[
f, I(w, k, t, τ)
]
=⇒ {B < f} ∧ {k < rw
B
log
[
1 +
kτ
1 + kt
]}
,
where we used the expression for I(w, k, t, τ) as appeared in equation 11. Note that the
first condition is automatically satisfied by assumption, so we focus on the second condition,
which can be approximated as (see appendix B)
k <
rw
B
log
[
1 +
τ
t
]
, (47)
meaning that the inequality represents the region below a straight line with slope log
[
1+ τt
]
in the w−k coordinate system, which corresponds to the subset Ω0. Similar to the discussion
in section 4.2, we see that the complement of this subset Ω/Ω0 (corresponding to the subset
of offenders) can be further partitioned into two subsets based on whether the offender
chooses a fine or imprisonment. And this partition can be represented as the same partition
curve as defined in equation 17
k =
rw
f
log
[
1 +
τ
t
]
. (48)
Note that f < B, so the slope of this line is steeper than that of the line in equation 47.
In some sense, the line defined in equation 48 is always “higher” than the line defined in
equation 47. We then see that the subset Ω1 corresponds to the region between the two
lines, which can be described by the following inequality
rw
B
log
[
1 +
τ
t
]
< k <
rw
f
log
[
1 +
τ
t
]
. (49)
And the subset Ω2 corresponds to the region above the higher of the two lines, which can
be described by the following inequality
k >
rw
f
log
[
1 +
τ
t
]
. (50)
To summarize, the partitioning of the population into the subsets {Ω0,Ω1,Ω2} is defined
by two (non-parallel) lines in the w− k coordinate system. This gives rise to a partitioning
scheme that is substantially different than that generated by DWI (as represented in figure
49
1).
Therefore, unlike the case with DWI where the subset Ω0 can be represented as a
rectangle in the first quadrant with length w0 − wm and width k0, the “rectangle” does
not exist in the case for burglary, so the parameterization of {w0, k0} makes little sense.
The more natural parameterization would be perhaps to define the slope log
[
1 + τt
]
as a
new parameter which essentially governs how “separated” the three population subsets are.
This gives rise to a completely new optimization problem, which may give rise to completely
new interesting phase transition behaviors.
8. Conclusion
In this work, we developed a model allowing for the maximization of the social welfare func-
tion with respect to all penal strategies. The model is general, comprehensive, and practical.
The model is general as it uses a graph theoretical approach to explore the dynamics of
crimes by representing them as arrows connecting from the offender to the victim. Very few
assumptions are made for the arrows, allowing for applicability to a wide range of crimes.
To describe a particular class of crime, we simply have to specify the corresponding proper-
ties of the arrows (see section 4.1). With the properties specified, the social welfare function
can then be constructed explicitly.
The model is comprehensive as the social welfare function accounts for all forms of
benefits and costs associated with the penal strategy, which include the social benefits of
deterring crimes, the social costs of implementing the penal strategy, and the opportu-
nity costs of punishing the offender. This comprehensive collection of social benefits and
costs not only allows for an accurate prediction the deterrent effect generated by the penal
strategy, but also ensures that the optimal penal strategy captures its full utility for the
population.
The model is practical in the sense that it can be reduced to an analytically tractable
form (see section 5) when certain simplifying assumptions are made in the context of the
crime of interest (see section 4.1). This can be done for any crime in general (see section 7.3),
not just the crime of DWI. This allows the evaluation of the social welfare function to be
performed without excessive computational expense, and motivates a deeper understanding
of the mechanism behind the interactions of various behavioral traits of the offenders and
various factors of penal strategy. Most importantly, the optimal penal strategy can be fully
expressed in terms of the distribution parameters of the behavioral traits of the population
(see section 4.4), which may be measured empirically (see section 6).
In this work, we focus on the wealth levels and discount rates of DWI offenders as
a case study. In the future, we hope to extend this model to investigate more dynamic
crime patterns (see section 7.2), and develop the required mathematical tools for studying
this dynamic system. In addition, we hope to model the behavioral traits of offenders more
thoroughly by considering other utility parameters beyond the two studied in this work, and
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conduct an empirical study on a larger sample size with new survey questions formulated
to elicit the response of these additional parameters.
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Appendix A. Properties of the Probability Weighing Function
Recall that the probability weighting function is defined in equation 3 as follow
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ ,
with domain p ∈ [0, 1] and parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). It can be easily shown that pi(0) = 0 and
pi(1) = 1, so there are at least two solutions to the equation pi(p) = p. We show that a third
solution exists for 0 < p < 1. To do so, we first set pi(p) = p
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ = p
⇐⇒ F (p) =(pi(p)
p
)γ =
pγ(γ−1)
pγ + (1− p)γ = 1.
Note that the equivalence holds for p ∈ [0, 1].
We first evaluate the value (or limit) of F (p) at p = {0, 12 , 1}
lim
p→0
F (p) =∞ F (1
2
) = 2−(1−γ)
2
< 1 F (1) = 1. (51)
Note that F (p) is a continuous function, so according to the intermediate value theorem,
there must be a solution to F (p) = 1 in p ∈ (0, 12), which we can denote as p0. We can
also show that F (p) is differentiable everywhere and the second derivative must be positive
everywhere, or F ′′(p) > 0, in p ∈ (0, 1). These properties, combined with equation 51,
implies that F (p) must have exactly one local minimum in p ∈ (0, 1), and no other critical
points.
This implies that p0 must be the only solution to F (p) = 1 in p ∈ (0, 1). Assuming that
there are more than one solutions to the equation F (p) = 1, then F (p) would necessarily
have more than two critical points, which creates a contradiction. Furthermore, if we
denote the local minimum to be p∗, then pi(p)p =
[
F (p)
]1/γ
must decrease monotonously for
p ∈ (0, p∗), and increase monotonously for p ∈ (p∗, 1).
Appendix B. Asymptotic Properties of the Partition Curve
Given a deterrence strategy targeting {w0, k0}, the pair {t, τ} must satisfy the following
constraint
k0
log[1 + k0τ1+k0t ]
=
pi(p)r
b− pi(p)s.
For the sake of clarity, we denote ψ = b−pi(p)spi(p)r , then we can write
τ = (eψk0 − 1)( 1
k0
+ t). (52)
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We can then solve equation 52 for τ and t, which allows us to specify the partition curve
as appeared in equation 17
w =
kf
r log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] .
Note that in this equation, k is a variable that varies with w, instead of being a fixed con-
stant k0.
In this form, there are still two main obstacles towards studying the partition curve.
The first obstacle is that 52 is an under-determined equation for τ and t, resulting in in-
finitely many possible partition curves. The second obstacle is that even if {t, τ} is uniquely
specified, the partition curve itself is a transcendental equation, making it analytically in-
tractable.
Therefore, we have to approximate the partition curve somehow such that w and k are
related polynomially, and the approximate equation does not depend explicitly on {t, τ}.
For the sake of clarity, we first denote the following function
J(k) =
k
log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] ,
with its domain being k > 0. Then the equation for the partition curve can be written as
w =
f
r
J(k).
We can study the behavior of J(k) in the two limits, τt  1 and τt  1. We show that
in both limits, the approximate form of the partition curve can be fully parameterized by
{w0, k0}.
B.1 Small τ/t Limit
We first note that J(k) is positive and monotonously increasing in its domain, or J ′(k) > 0
for k > 0. We study the asymptotic behavior of J(k) by looking at the limits of J ′(k) at
the two ends of its domain
lim
k→0
J ′(k) =
1
2
+
t
τ
lim
k→∞
J ′(k) =
1
log
[
1 + τt
] .
This implies that the function J(k) is well behaved in the two limits, meaning that its first
derivative approaches a constant. To ensure that the function does not behave unpredictably
for intermediate values of k, we take the second derivative of the function, which we claim
to be negative for all k
J ′′(k) = C0(k, t, τ)
[
2kτ − (2 + 2kt+ kτ) log(1 + kτ
1 + kt
)
]
< 0, (53)
where C0(k, t, τ) is some prefactor that can easily be shown positive. Then to show inequal-
ity 53 to be true, we only have to show that the bracketed term is positive, or
log(1 +
kτ
1 + kt
) >
kτ
1 + kt+ kτ2
,
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which can be derived easily from the following logarithmic inequality
log(1 + x) >
2x
2 + x
for all x > 0.
Now, knowing that J ′′(k) < 0, we induce that J ′(k) must decrease monotonously from
limk→0 J ′(k) = 12 +
t
τ to limk→∞ J
′(k) =
[
log(1 + τt )
]−1
. We can Laurent expand the latter
as follow
lim
k→∞
J ′(k) =
1
log
[
1 + τt
] = 1
2
+
t
τ
+O(
τ
t
) = lim
k→0
J ′(k) +O(
τ
t
),
where O( τt ) denotes terms that scale smaller than
τ
t in magnitude. In the limit of
τ
t  1,
J ′(k) is approximately equal at the two limits, and combining this with the fact that J ′(k)
is a monotonously decreasing function for k > 0, we see that J ′(k) can be approximated as
a constant for all k > 0. Therefore, we can approximate J(k) as a linear function with slope
1
2 +
t
τ . In other words, the partition curve can be approximated as a straight line defined
by the following equation
w =
f
r
J(k) =
f
r
(
1
2
+
t
τ
)k.
This is simply the equation for a line that passes through the origin and {w0, k0}, so we
can simply the equation to
w
k
=
w0
k0
, (54)
giving us an expression parameterized only by {w0, k0}.
B.2 Large τ/tw Limit
In the limit of τt  1, equation 52 becomes
τ
t
≈ eψk0 ,
and the function J(k) can be approximated as
J(k) =
k
log
[
1 + kτ1+kt
] ≈ k
log
[
τ
t
] ≈ k
ψk0
.
The partition curve is then
w =
f
r
J(k) =
f
r
k
ψk0
,
which also represents a line that passes through the origin and {w0, k0}. Therefore, the
equation for the partition curve is the same as equation 54, or
w
k
=
w0
k0
.
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Appendix C. Asymptotic Properties of J2
We first consider the simple optimization problem where the goal is to find the minimum
of f(t) defined as follow
f(t) =
a
t
+ bt,
where t, a, b > 0. It is easy to see that the maximum is attained at t∗ =
√
a/b, with the
maximum being f(t∗) = 2
√
ab.
Recall that the social cost of enforcing imprisonment is given in section 5.2 as
J2 ≈ ρ
[
c0 +
ct
mt
+ (cτ − Λl)τ
] {
(1− vα)e−κ0 + αvα e
−κ0
κ0
+ α
e−vκ0
vκ0
}
+ ρ
α
α− 1
[
gs+ (gr + Λb)τ
] {[
(1− vα−1)e−κ0 + (α− 1)vα−1 e
−κ0
κ0
+ (α− 1)e
−vκ0
vκ0
]}
.
(55)
Given a strategy targeting k0, the pair {t, τ} has to satisfy the below constraint (see equation
52)
τ = (eψk0 − 1)( 1
k0
+ t) ≈ eψβκ0 ,
where we assumed that k0 is large and used the denotation κ0 =
k0
β . Then J2 scales as
follow
J2 ∼ B(κ0)A
t
+B(κ0)τ
∼ B(κ0)A
t
+B(κ0)e
ψβκ0t,
where A is some constant, and the asymptotic behavior of B(κ0) is governed by
B(κ0) ∼ e
−vκ0
κ0
,
or simply the slowest decaying term in the large brackets of equation 55 (note that v =
wm
w0
< 1). We then see the minimum of J2 over {t, τ} is attained at
t∗ ∼
√
B(κ0)A
B(κ0)eψβκ0
∼ exp [− ψβ
2
κ0
]
τ∗ ∼ eψβκ0t∗ = exp [ψβ
2
κ0
]
,
with the minimal value of J2 being
J2(κ0, t
∗) ∼
√
AB2(κ0)eψβκ0 ∼
exp
[
(ψβ2 − v)κ0
]
κ0
.
Therefore, we see that in order for J2 to decay with increasing κ0, the following condition
must be satisfied
ψβ
2
− v < 0.
Under this condition, we can minimize the total cost of imprisonment by targeting an
arbitrarily large κ0 value.
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Appendix D. Constrained Optimization of Polynomial
Consider a polynomial function of the following form
f(x) = xa(b− cx),
where a, b, c > 0. The first derivative is given by
f ′(x) = xa−1
[
ab− c(a+ 1)x].
Setting f ′(x′) = 0, we find the critical point to be x′ = abc(a+1) (where we ignored the trivial
x′ = 0). A second derivative test shows f ′′(x′) < 0, which indicates that it is a local max-
imum. It can be easily checked that f ′(x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, x′) and f ′(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x′,+∞).
Therefore, for x ∈ (0, x0], where x0 < x′, the global maximum is attained at x = x0,
as f(x) is a monotonously increasing function from 0 to x0. Similarly, for x ∈ [x0,+∞),
where x0 > x
′, the global maximum is attained at x = x0 as well, as f(x) is a monotonously
decreasing function for x > x0. Therefore, given any x0 ∈ (0,+∞), the global maximum
for x ∈ [x0,+∞) is given by
x∗ = max[x′, x0].
Appendix E. Optimization over {v, p}
Note that in section 5.4, the optimization of J(p, v) is essentially solved from a numerical
standpoint. However, under a certain condition, there is an analytic expression for the
maximum of J(v, p). This is possible when
po(1) ≥ pmin ⇐⇒ bwm − l
gswm + cf
≥ pi−1( bβ
2r + sβ
)
,
and the global maximum of J(v, p) is attained at v = 1 and p = pmin =
bβ
2r+sβ .
To see why this is, we first note that J(v, po(v)) is a monotonously increasing function
with respect to v for v ∈ [vmin, 1]. To see why this is, consider the pair {v1, v2} where
vmin < v1 < v2 < 1, then the following must be true
J(v2, po(v2)) > J(v1, po(v2)) > J(v1, po(v1)).
The first inequality is true because v2 is a global maximum for J(v, po(v2)) (see appendix
D). The second inequality is true because J is a monotonously decreasing function with
respect to p for a fixed v (see equation 33) and po(v) is a monotonously decreasing function
with respect to v (see equation 34), so
v2 > v1 =⇒ po(v1) > po(v2) =⇒ J(v, po(v2)) > J(v, po(v1)).
Therefore, J(v, po(v)) is a monotonously increasing function with respect to v, meaning
that J(1, po(1)) is the global maximum on the curve po(v).
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Then for any pair of p ∈ [pmin, 1] and v ∈ [pc(v), 1], we have
J(1, pmin) ≥ J(1, po(1)) ≥ J(vo(p), p) ≥ J(v, p),
where the first inequality is a direct result of po(1) ≥ pmin, and the second inequality is due
to J(1, po(1)) being the global maximum on the curve po(v), and the last inequality is due
to vo(p) being the global maximum of J(v, p) for a fixed p. Therefore, the global maximum
of J is attained at v = 1 and p = pmin.
Appendix F. Estimating the Distribution of Discount Rates
F.1 Overview of Model
Recall that the disutility of imprisonment for an offender is given (in equation 11) by
I(w, k, t, τ) =
rw
k
log
[
1 +
kτ
1 + kt
]
.
Among n participants in the survey, we determine that the participant i is indifferent
between an immediate imprisonment of 2 hours and a delayed imprisonment of τj hours
delayed by tij hours. This gives us the following equation
I(wi, ki, tij , τj) = I(wi, ki, 0, 2)
=⇒ tij = 1
ki
(
τj
2
− 1),
where ki is assumed to be the discount rate of the member.
The uncertainty of tij scales with tij (see section 6.1), so it is necessary to associate tij
with a multiplicative error, giving us the following model
tij(1 + ij) =
1
ki
(
τj
2
− 1).
For the sake of simplicity, we denote rij = (
τj
2 − 1)/tij , which allows us to write
ki(1 + ij) = rij ,
where the errors ij = N (0, σi) can be modeled as iid normal RVs with mean 0 and variance
σ2i , which we assume to be different for different participants.
The list of imprisonment lengths τ = {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4} = {2.5, 4, 10, 20} is a fixed vector
for all participants, but the number of measurements of tij made on participant i, or mi,
depends on the responses of the participant. This is based on the assumption that in a
practical scenario, there must a point where the imprisonment is long enough such that the
increase in disutility cannot be compensated by any delay in punishment. We can express
this as
∃τ0 [τ > τ0 =⇒ t =∞],
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where τ0 denotes the “limit” of imprisonment length that the participant will accept relative
to an immediate punishment of 2 hours. Therefore, for τj > τ0, it makes no sense to measure
t anymore as we can expect it to be infinite. We then set the number of measurements for
participant i to be
mi = min{j | tij =∞}.
In other words, the participant will respond with tij = ∞ for j ≥ m1, and we can set the
data point at mi as
rimi = 0.
Using the tij measurements, we can estimate ki for the participant i, and using the
estimators of k for all the participants, we can construct the distribution of k for the
population. We assume that the discount rate k is distributed as a zero-inflated exponential
distribution (see equation 23)
fK(k) = (1− ρ)δ(k) + ρ 1
β
exp(−k
β
),
where δ is the Dirac delta function. This distribution is completely specified by the pair
{β, ρ}.
F.2 Estimating k for a Member
A natural estimator of ki would simply be the average of rij values, or
kˆi =
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
rij ,
where mi is the number of measurements for participant i. (For the rest of the section,
the index i is assumed for m, and any sum over j is assumed to be from 1 to mi.) The
estimator kˆi is unbiased since
E(kˆi) = E
[ 1
m
∑
j
ki(1 + ij)
]
=
1
m
ki
∑
j
E
[
1 + ij
]
= ki.
For m > 1, we can estimate the variance of the error σ2i by evaluating the following
expression
J(σ2i ) =
1
m
∑
j
(
rij
kˆi
− 1)2 = 1
m
∑
j
E
[(1 + ij
1 + i
− 1
)2]
=
1
m
∑
j
E
[(1 + ij
1 + i
)2 − 21 + ij
1 + i
+ 1
]
=
1
m
E
[∑
j(1 + ij)
2
(1 + i)2
]
− 2
m
E
[m+∑j ij
1 + i
]
+ 1 = E
[(1 + i1)2
(1 + i)2
]
− 1
=E
[( 1
1
m +
1
m
∑
j 6=1(1+ij)
1+i1
)2]− 1,
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where we’ve denoted i =
1
m
∑
j ij as the mean error. We can denote
X =
1
m
∑
j 6=1(1 + ij)
1 + i1
,
as the ratio between two independent normal RVs, with the numerator having mean m−1m
and variance m−1
m2
σ2i , and the denominator having mean 1 and variance σ
2
i . The pdf of X
can be derived to be (by Jacobian transforming the pdf)
fX(x) =
m(m− 1)(1 +mx)√
2pi(−1 +m+m2x2) 32σ
exp
[
− (1−m+mx)
2
2(−1 +m+m2x2)σ2
]
.
This allows us to numerically evaluate the value of J(σ2i ) for any given pair {m,σi}, meaning
that we can find σi after determining the J(σi) value for the participant
56. As an example,
at m = 4 and σ ≈ 0.2, the two are related as J(σi) ≈ 0.77σ2, which allows us to take
σˆi
2 ≈ 1
0.77
1
m
∑
j
(
rij
kˆi
− 1)2.
We can then use σˆi to compute the standard error of the estimator kˆi
E(kˆ2i ) =
1
m2
E
{[∑
j
ki(1 + ij)
]2}
=
1
m2
k2i
∑
jj′
E
[
1 + ij + ij′ + ijij′
]
=
1
m2
k2i
∑
jj′
(1 + δjj′σ
2
i ) = k
2
i (1 +
σ2i
m
)
SE(kˆi) =
√
E(kˆ2i )−E(kˆi)2 =
kˆσˆi√
m
.
We can then use this standard error to constructed the confidence interval reported in sec-
tion 6.1.
As an important side note, for the special case where mi = 1, or when the participant
will not choose a punishment of τ1 = 2.5 over 2 hours regardless of the delay, we have ri1 = 0
as the only data point (see section F.1). To account for this, we simply set the estimator
of ki to be kˆi = 0, with the standard error being SE(kˆi) = 0.
F.3 Estimating {β, ρ} for the Population
We first begin by introducing a random variable K ′ which relates to K as follow
K ′ = 1(K 6= 0),
56. This can be done, for example, by constructing a look-up table relating a sequence of σi values (with
some small increments between consecutive elements) with the corresponding sequence of J(σ2i ). This is
the method that we chose.
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where 1 denotes the indicator function that evaluates to 1 if its argument is true and 0
otherwise. Assuming that we are randomly sampling n values of K independently from
fK(k), or K = {K1,K2, ...,Kn}, then the number of times that the corresponding K ′
variables evaluate to 1 can be denoted as
N ′ =
n∑
i=1
K ′i.
We see that N ′ follows a binomial distribution
Pr(N ′ = n′) =
(
n
n′
)
ρn
′
(1− ρ)n′−n′ ,
with the unbiased estimator of ρ being
ρˆ =
N ′
n
,
and the standard error of the estimate being
SE(ρˆ) =
√
ρˆ(1− ρˆ)
n
.
To estimate β, we focus on the conditional distribution of fK(k) for non zero K, which
is simply an exponential distribution with mean β, or
fK(k |K ′ = 1) = 1
β
e
− k
β .
This means that β can be estimated from the non-zero values of ki from the participants.
A fairly simple estimator of β would be
βˆ =
( n∑
i=1
mi
)−1 n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
rij .
The estimator is unbiased since
E(βˆ) =
(∑
i
mi
)−1∑
i
∑
j
E
[
ki(1 + ij)
]
= β
(∑
i
mi
)−1∑
i
∑
j
1
= β,
where the sum of j from 1 to mi and the sum of i from 1 to n is assumed as usual.
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The variance of this estimator is
E(βˆ2k) =
(∑
i
mi
)−2
E
{[∑
ij
ki(1 + ij)
]2}
=
(∑
i
mi
)−2∑
ii′
∑
jj′
E
[
kiki′
]
E
[
1 + ij + i′j′ + iji′j′
]
=
(∑
i
mi
)−2∑
ii′
∑
jj′
(β2)(1 + δii′)(1 + σ
2
i δii′δjj′)
=
(∑
i
mi
)−2
β2
∑
ii′
∑
jj′
(1 + δii′ + 2σ
2
i δii′δjj′)
= β2
(∑
i
mi
)−2[(∑
i
mi
)2
+
∑
i
m2i + 2
∑
i
miσ
2
i
]
= β2(1 +
∑
i
(
mi∑
imi
)2 + 2σ2),
where we denoted
σ2 =
(∑
i
mi
)−2∑
i
miσ
2
i
as the “weighted” average of the error variances. Therefore, we find the standard error of
the estimate to be√
Var(µˆk) =
√
E(µˆ2k)−
[
E(µˆk)
]2
= β
√∑
i
(
mi∑
imi
)2 + 2σ2.
Appendix G. Sample Variance Statistics
Let X = {X1, ..., Xn} be independent normal RVs with zero mean, with the RV Xi having
variance σ2i . Denote X as the average of the RVs
X =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi.
We then have ∑
i
X2i = (n− 1)S2 + nX2,
where S2 is the sample variance defined as follow
S2 =
1
n− 1
∑
i
(Xi −X)2.
Note that X2i ∼ Γ(12 , 2σ2i ) follows a gamma distribution, with shape k = 12 and rate
θ = 2σ2i . In addition, nX
2 ∼ Γ(12 , 2σ2) also follows a gamma distribution, with shape 12
and rate θ = 2σ2, where σ2 denotes the average variance of the RVs
σ2 =
1
n
∑
i
σ2i .
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Since (n−1)S2 and nX2 are independent, we have the following relationship for the moment
generating functions (noting that the MGF of the addition of two independent RVs is the
product of their respective MGFs)
M∑
iX
2
i
(t) = M(n−1)S2(t)MnX2(t), (56)
where
M∑
iXi
(t) =
∏
i
MXi(t) =
∏
i
(1− 2σ2i t)−1/2
M
nX
2(t) = (1− 2σ2t)−1/2.
(57)
We can then use equation 56 to solve for M(n−1)S2(t) by plugging in the expressions in
equation 57
M(n−1)S2(t) =
M∑
iX
2
i
(t)
M
nX
2(t)
=
[∏
i
(1− 2σ2i t)−1/2
]
(1− 2σ2t)1/2.
This allows us to find the first and second moments of the random variable (n − 1)S2
to be
(n− 1)E(S2) = M ′(n−1)S2(0) =
[∑
i
σ2i
]− σ2
= (n− 1)σ2
(n− 1)2E(S4) = M ′′(n−1)S2(0) = 3
∑
i
σ4i +
∑
i 6=i′
σ2i σ
2
i′ − 2σ2
∑
i
σ2i − (σ2)2
= 2nσ4 + (n2 − 2n− 1)(σ2)2,
which allows us to find the variance of S2
Var(S2) = E(S4)− [E(S2)]2
=
1
(n− 1)2
{
2nσ4 + (n2 − 2n− 1)(σ2)2 − (n− 1)2(σ2)2}
= 2
nσ4 − (σ2)2
(n− 1)2 .
This result will be useful when we study the standard error of the variance estimator of the
distribution of γ (probability weighing factor) in appendix H (the following section).
Appendix H. Estimating Probability Weighing Factor
The participant i is indifferent between spending Bij amount of money for hiring a dedicated
driver and committing DWI under a pj chance of apprehension. We then set the utility
function to be a normal RV of mean 0, or i = N (0, σi)
Bij − pi(pj , γi)(Si +Di) = i,
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where Di is the disutiltiy of the punishment and Si is the stigma associated with apprehen-
sion (both of which we do not know the values to). Note that Si+Di are γi are two unknown
constants for participant i, so they constitute the two regression coefficients in this analysis.
This presents a non-linear regression problem, where the goal is to minimize the following
for each i
m∑
j=1
[
Bij − (Si +Di)pi(pj , γi)
]2
,
over γi and Si+Di. We can find the estimator γˆi and its confidence interval using standard
statistical analysis packages, such as the non-linear regression toolbox in MATLAB. We
denote the standard error of γi as σγi .
If we assume that among the population, γ is distributed normally with mean µγ and
variance σ2γ , then we see that the estimator γˆi is a normal RV with mean µγ and variance
σ2γ + σ
2
γi . We then easily see that the unbiased estimator of µγ and its standard error is
given by
µˆγ =
1
n
∑
i
γˆi SE(µˆγ) =
√
1
n
√
σ2γ + σ
2
γi ,
where σ2γi denotes the average standard variance of γˆi, or
σ2γi =
1
n
∑
i
σ2γi .
Furthermore, using the results from appendix G, we can find the unbiased estimator of σ2γ
(the variance of the distribution of γ) and its standard error to be
σˆ2γ =
1
n− 1
∑
i
(γˆi − γˆ)2 − σ2γi
SE(σˆ2γ) =
√
2
n− 1
√
(n− 1)σ4γ + 2(n− 1)σ2γσ2γi + nσ4γi − (σ2γi)2.
This allows us to construct the confidence interval for µˆγ and σˆ2γ , the estimators of mean
and variance of the distribution of γ among the population. Note that we can easily derive
the estimator and the standard error for σγ using the Delta method (if we assume that σˆ2γ
is approximately normal, which is true in the limit of large n), and this gives us
σˆγ =
√
σˆ2γ SE(σˆγ) =
1
2σˆγ
SE(σˆ2γ).
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